*Ahmad Dzakirin
“Too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough, the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or to rake with its claws.” (The War of the Flea)
Introduction
The war of the flea might be relevantly illustrated as a fight between David and Goliath. Goliath as described in Books of Revelation either Old Testament or Koran, the highly trained-strong man that was finally crippled to death after David hit him in his vulnerable point. The victory of David –he was delineated as shepherd boy who was eager to fight the tyranny- was emanated from his smartness and mobility. Otherwise, the defeat of Goliath can be at best explained the unpreparedness and surprise due to the highly physical preoccupation.
Post-cold war, the collapse of the Soviet military preponderance and political hegemony irrevocably led to the two momentous phenomena in military strategy, firstly, the less likelihood of war attrition. Secondly, the increasing significance of insurgency’s strategy after the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam in 1975 and Soviet troops from Afghanistan
The writing-up is trying to examine the indirect strategy both in concept and in application and how it is comparatively applied into many contemporary insurgents’ movements (Vietnam, Afghanistan and Palestine resistance). The paper will be limited in term of interior (moral force) and exterior (political and diplomacy pressure) maneuver have been successfully applied in two successful insurgencies, i.e. Vietcong and Afghan Mujahideen and at the end of the discussion as a comparison- HAMAS Palestinian strategy in gaining overwhelming Palestinian political support. The success of HAMAS in power is irrevocably deemed to be the successful approach of indirect strategy in term of ‘popular support’ and the relevance of its persistent violent use, i.e. guerilla warfare.
How the Indirect Strategy is Employed in Insurgency?
There are two predominant strands advocated in war strategy, Jomini’s and Fueller’s direct strategy and Liddle Hart’s indirect approach. The former exhortation is the best way to defeat enemy’s political will is to defeat enemy’s army in a decisive war, meanwhile the other instruments are considered as secondary issue. Criticizing the devastating impact of casualties of such strategy, Hart- the latter, while still discerns the bringing out of the political imposition through the attainment of military victory, but seek much a strategic situation rather than a direct battle through the strategic dislocation both physically to attain the least resistance and psychologically to create the sense of being trapped and helplessness, to attain the least expectation.
Andre Beaufre -French War Strategist- different with Liddell in term of indirect approach applied- preferred to employ much more likely political maneuver rather than military maneuver. He insisted to place the Liddell Hart’s indirect approach in the category of direct strategy and as preparatory maneuvering to employ the direct method. He delineated his method “to seek to obtain a result by methods other than military victory…. All is too often its importance has not been realized; people have not perceived that the focal point of the struggle was not in the area where fighting was taking place but outside it.” According to him, the focal point for the strategic attainment was laid on politically rather than militarily. The military maneuver used was intended in term of deterrence effect to prevent enemy reacting on large scale and the use of its resources still remained strictly limited. The likelihood of the success was dependent on the availability of the freedom of actions within geographical area through piecemeal erosion or guerilla method (interior maneuver) but will be mostly determined by the success of some actions outside the fighting area, e.g. “estimate of the international reaction the enemy’ moral fiber and the sensitivity of external pressure” that was termed as “exterior maneuver”. The simultaneity, therefore, of two maneuvers is needed, i.e. “the assurance of the maximum freedom of action through the piecemeal erosion while at the same time more importantly psychologically paralyzes the enemy’ will to wage war through multitude of deterrence checks such as: political, economic and diplomatic measures.”
The successful procedures of actions hinges on two determining conditions, first, “the military deterrence force must pose a sufficient pose a sufficient overall threat to prevent the enemy reacting on a major scale.” In term of guerilla force, Steven Meltz contended that there are three influential, simultaneous and interlinked factors determined the success of warfare: “force protection (via dispersion, sanctuary, the use complex terrain, effective counterintelligence, etc.); actions to erode the will, strength and legitimacy of the regime (via violence and political-psychological programs); and augmentation of resources and support) that varied over time and across region.”
Second, “all the actions envisaged must be in consonance with a definite line of policy” that at the end of day will pose the success of mobilizing masses and raising their political consciousness as well. To regain it, the guerrilla warfare must have the political objectives that coincide with the aspirations of the people and in turn, they will benefit their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance, as popularly termed ‘winning heart and mind’. The intertwined linkage between both is similarly like between fish and water. He said,” The essence of guerilla warfare is thus political in character….. and guerilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them; it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”
As occurred in China and Vietnam War, Steven Meltz pointed out the necessity of the political agenda and its close accordance with the significance of the ideology that persistently underpinned the resistance. “Ideology set up on preconceptions, propensities, grievances, resentments, hopes, desires, beliefs, cultural variables, historical factors, and social norms. It is more likely to provide coherence between resentment as well as remedy. An effective insurgent ideology, in other words, must “fit” a given society.” Moreover, the insurgency will resume the strength if the resistance relating to ‘national or liberation insurgency’. It coherently has the ‘organic mobilizing factor’ or ‘self restoring system’ to resist alien occupation. Ideology will “unify to unify, inspire, explain why the existing system is unjust or illegitimate, and rationalize the use of violence to alter or overthrow the existing system” as well as keep the population support at the highest level. The combination of nationalism with Marxism or later Islamism has been proved to be powerful and highly effective either in its protrectedness and impacts, i.e. in Afghanistan Mujahideen against Soviet occupation. In the past, the Chinese Red Army benefited the power and gained the strength when they painted their movement as an anti-Japanese occupation and similarly Viet Minh against French occupation.
There are at least two important factors that lead to the success of insurgencies in bringing out of the erosion of the preponderant enemy’s will.
Firstly, the concept of the insurgency is precisely characterized as the war of the flea, no defined front but instead front can be anywhere that makes too many for enemy’s force to grip with and counts heavily on mobility warfare to strike the enemy on widest possible area. The target is intended to extend the security problem for the enemy’s force. In response, they will use a greater force to control the area that lead to the overstretching and overextending in securing area. It can be vulnerable for mobile attacks. French in Algeria Egypt , Tunisia Kenya Malaya insurgencies stemmed from the absence of ‘base and sanctuary’. overstretched more than 300 thousands troops to encounter less than 30.000 genuine insurgents. The function of close base is very pivotal and determining in key success of insurgencies like Ho Chi Minh trail along the borders in Indo China War and and
Secondly, the effectiveness of “the psychological dislocation (in a broader meaning) is aimed at both their own force and enemy. Propaganda, indoctrination, diplomacy and military deterrence are employed and closely-knit with the interior maneuver, i.e. the enhancement of moral force. Military maneuver is simply designed to affect the psychological erosion both the moral of enemy’s force or enemy’s domestic political circumstances, meanwhile the rest, the scope of actions depends primarily on psychological sphere. In guerilla warfare, the problem of super powers like the US is less tolerant of casualties in small wars than the great casualties of their opponents as seen in Somalia and Iraq London or Washington
A Battle
Indirect strategy was initially introduced by Liddell Hart and adopted by Hitler –employing ‘piecemeal’ tactics- in World War II which was abandoned later. Indirect strategy took a shape once more with the success of Soviet Red Army –by slow creeping diffusion- of hitting back Germany’s overextending army besieged Moscow and Leningrad. Ever since World War II, it became more fashionable –thank to Andre Beaufre- which more concerned the use of diplomacy and political measures rather than military victory. The China
One of the battles for two contending camps is to differently overview the COG (Central of Gravity). Direct strategy views “the enemy field forces as COG while diplomacy, propaganda and other instruments are geared toward supporting the military actions.” Such approach painted the success in first Gulf War in 1991 when US
Unfortunately, the Clausewitzian-minded U.S. security establishment was incorrectly convinced that obliterated North Vietnam’s capability of “waging war would affect its will to wage war”. Even though the US Japan
The Successful Indirect Strategy of Insurgency (A Study Case)
How then the indirect strategy applied in contemporary guerilla warfare in accordance with the significance of non-military strategy as determining success key of insurgencies. The discussion will be limited in regard with exterior maneuver, the focal point of the struggle, i.e. decisive political maneuver and interior maneuver, i.e. moral force in line with exterior ‘world wide plane’.
A. Vietnam
“No one who witnessed the chaotic evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese by helicopter from the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon on 30 Apr 1975 will ever forget it or the lesson it seemed to drive home: even the most powerful conventional military force on earth could prove impotent against guerilla warfare practiced by a weaker but more resolute force.” The US troops withdrawal was seen a first failure of the US US US embassy as a symbol of the highest US military command in South East Asia psychologically shocked -thanked to the US
Post the Tet Offensive indeed had a great impact of American public consternation either politically or morally. It was indicated by the weakening support of independent media over the legitimacy of war and the rising oppositions of Anti War movements throughout nation. In term of media for example, Westmoreland said that media had intentionally created the gloom and the doom of the war and the aura of defeat after the Tet Offensive. Daniel Hallin and Clarence Wyatt pointed out no linkage between the media bias and the lower public support but acknowledged the shift of media coverage after the offensive. The American public itself after the offensive preferred to believe the press report and described it more accurate rather than a public statement of the administration in informing Vietnam
After the Tet offensive unquestionably affected the bigger resentment and discontent of the war that led to the bigger increasing support of anti-war movement which gained less support and was deemed to be peripheral dissidents before the offensive. It looked like the insurgents, i.e. Vietcong lid the small light of smoke and left it to be biggest fire. For Viet Cong itself, they were unforeseen of the unimaginable impact. The concerted counter-efforts perpetrated by the administration to prevent the domestic turmoil due to the anti war campaign by branding the leftist movements that covertly financed by authoritarian communist states, but it did not help recovering the public trust on Johnson administration that ended up his refusal of second-term nomination in 1969 and the halt of strategic bombing.
Ho Chi Minh seized the moment by flaring up the moral ground of the war in term of justice and right of independence through ‘persuasive diplomacy’. He tried to convince the US public –once again thanked to independent media- that free Vietnam was not a threat for the US interests in South East Asia as well as called for the rights for self determination. Such diplomacy convincingly shaped a role in weakening the will for continuing the war on the moral ground and continuously mounted on stable pressure in subsequent years of the following US elected president, Nixon. He was surely not confident on addressing the issue without adapting the political dynamics.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan is an interesting sample of successful insurgency in regard to the internationalization of the religiously- escalated conflict and the undeniably impact of the war over Soviet. The US favorably played an important role of the internationalization but the success itself stemmed from the remarkably ideological resilience, i.e. Islam to drive the internationally escalating conflict –since before invasion, it was characterized as the domestic rebellion against communist regime-, that finally eroded the enemy’s will to wage the war. After the Soviet Invasion of 1979, Abdullah Azzam -the member of al-Ikhwan (Moslem Brethren) and well-respected Islamic scholar issued a fatwa (Islamic decree) that Jihad defending Moslem land in Palestine and Afghanistan was Fard Ayn (first religious obligation after faith) of every Moslem in surrounding areas and –if not sufficiently resolved- over the world. He and Kamal Sananiri (Ikhwan special envoy) then moved to Peshawar to lead directly the international Jihad and set up the ‘Maktab al Khadamat’ (Office of Service) for social service and publications and subsequently ‘Bayt al Anshar’ (The Home of the Mujahideen) to provide a safe sanctuary and training for international recruits. Based on Zawahiri memoir, Kamal was arrested by CIA in Croatia in the mid of 1981 and handed over and later killed by Egypt Security in his detention. Sananiri was considered to be the third prominent figure of Ikhwan after Tilmisani and Mustafa Masyhur in maintaining close-contact the Brethren in Egypt
Azzam presence in Afghanistan played a very significant role in escalating resistance in the banner of Islamic Jihad. He benefited his previous profession as a lecture in Al Azhar University and later King Abdullah Azis University
Azzam played ‘faith diplomacy’ that in one side characterized the unifying, persuasive, protective, religious and skillful leader of fighters that successfully united the diverse backgrounds and in other side smartly benefited the effectiveness of the religious approach either in attracting the worldwide support of Moslem community or heightened the degree of the bitter and unrelenting resistance against alien occupation that had been undoubtedly defined and had a justified ground in Islamic perspective. It was Jihad against oppressor that will be attributed with the highest award of heaven that every believer will eagerly pursue. For Azzam, Peshawar
The international movement, Al-Ikhwan played an important role behind the success of Azzam project. Based on the memoir of Zawahiri, the second leader of Al-Qaeda and used to be a physician, Ikhwan facilitated him on behalf of his expertise to help the medical and social network in Peshawar
But later both Zawahiri and Bin Laden -later setting up of new radical movement of ‘Al Qaeda’- conflicted with Ikhwan due to its allegedly moderate policy, especially after the death of Abdullah Azzam and the emerging conflict among Mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Ikhwan withdrew from its involvement of the conflict. Afghan was considered to be a failed experiment of ‘ideal Islamic modern state’ that was aimed by Ikhwan together with Sudan.
The Evolving Indirect Strategy
We can see the different approaches how the indirect strategy employed. In Vietnam Vietnam was not a threat of American interest in South East Asia . The psychological impact was quite remarkable. Quoting Mao, eventually how most powerful the enemy’s force is likely irrelevant and impotent in such circumstance. Even tough, the Vietnam
In similar circumstance happened in Afghanistan, there was a combination of interior maneuver, Islam as moral force that significantly enhanced the resistance became a relentless, elusive, and unbeatable and exterior maneuver, the focal point of struggle, internationalization of Jihad by benefiting the religious issue to fertilize the solidarity, support, fanaticism and protrectedness among Moslem community in the world that irrevocably resulted in Soviet erosion and collapse in ten years of fighting, but in term of further political objective after the withdrawal, Mujahideen failed to materialize due to the friction, animosity and the lack of unity among them.
As a comparison in term of moral force and in line with people aspiration, HAMAS indirect strategy focuses on two political strategies, firstly, consistently launched armed-resistance as a basis of resistance as a strategy to psychologically relive the Palestinian regretness after the decline of united resistance led by PLO and the subsequent eviction PLO from Lebanon in 1982 and its PLO’s decision to move to Tunisia. HAMAS military wing launched most daring guerilla warfare against Israeli military within 1967 occupied territory and was then extended in other deep Israeli territories with morally-questioned suicide bombings. At the same time, HAMAS regained people support through social service and charity as part of their political wing that was autonomously separated from previously owned-military wing. They provided educations, health service and built a social network that immediately regains supports among Palestine Palestine ’s representatives as well as shifted its resistance against Israel
The indirect strategy is likely to be still relevant in term of strategy employed by the weak force and even evolved and metamorphed in the most advanced one in term of war on terrorism, the threat of global resistance or insurgency against the US superpower. “Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant”. If the strategy has been previously succeeded to erode and distract the political will of the powerful enemy to wage the war like in Vietnam and in certain degree- in Afghanistan collapsed the super power, such motivation and the sophistication of the strategy through past experiences will be more likely shaping the future strategy but in a greater and broader theatre, worldwide.
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