Nabi SAW adalah pribadi mulia yang unik. Semua penisbatan keagungan manusia ada dan melekat pada diri beliau. Mulai dari seorang suami yang romantis dan penuh perhatian, guru yang bijak, panglima perang yang tegas, pedagang yang jujur hingga pemimpin politik yang cerdas. Maka tepat sekali jika dikatakan oleh Sayyid Qutb jika Nabi adalah penjelmaan Alqur’an yang hidup.
Pun dalam ranah politik, kita mendapatkan banyak i’tibar dari Siroh Nabi. Nabi telah melakukan musyarokah siyasi dengan kaum Musyrikin di Mekkah melalui dua perjanjian Muthayyibun dan Fudhul. Perjanjian ini sejatinya mencerminkan partisipasi politik Rasulullah di tengah tradisi dan kultur politik masyarakat Jahiliyyah, atau lebih tepatnya sistem Jahiliyyah. Namun hal itu tidak menghalangi beliau disepanjang karakter perjanjian itu mencerminkan semangat universalitas Islam.
“Too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough, the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or to rake with its claws.” (The War of the Flea)
The collapse of Soviet bloc affected the erosion of long standing strategic rationale behind the major US military deployment in East Asia. In addition to the US economic difficulties that was reflected in its domestic economic constraints on military expenditure and the Philippines refusal to extend the leases of the US’s military bases in Philippines. Philippines demanded a complete US military withdrawal by November 1992. It irrevocably created a “window of opportunity” for major powers such as China, Japan and India to be more assertive and independent after the US withdrawal.
Indonesia dan Malaysia adalah sepasang negeri jiran yang sebelum diperkenalkannya konsep negara modern (pasca perjanjian Westphalia 1648) tak mengenal batas-batas fisik maupun batas-batas kultural. Era kolonialisme Eropa Barat di kedua negara dilanjutkan dengan lahirnya negara modern Indonesia pada 17 Agustus 1945 dan Malaysia pada 31 Agustus 1957 berkonsekuensi terciptanya garis demarkasi antara kedua negara yang kemudian disebut sebagai perbatasan. Perbatasan dalam artian fisik kemudian tercipta di sepanjang pulau Kalimantan sejauh 2004 kilometer (yang merupakan perbatasan fisik terpanjang Indonesia dengan negara lain) dan perbatasan laut di sepanjang Selat Malaka, Laut China Selatan, dan Laut Sulawesi.
This paper provides an analysis on the PKS Competitiveness, their strategies and its interaction with the Government of Indonesia (GOI) using Porter’s Diamond and J Curve frameworks with effort to smooth and to sustain their policy reform process. In the first section, it will analyze the background of PKS movement and analyze their competitiveness and their strategies movement in Indonesia political world. The second part will examine the PKS interaction and their impacts to the GOI. The third section will give recommendation for the PKS activities in the future to overcome and to sustain the PKS movement and conclude their role in the Indonesian political development.
Apakah perubahan iklim global (climate change) menyebabkan disintegrasi pada suatu negara dan memicu konflik antar negara? Para pakar non traditional security sejatinya bersepakat bahwa dampak perubahan iklim berpotensi besar melahirkan konflik domestik dan instabilitas keamanan baik dalam lingkup regional dan global. Namun para pakar ini tidak dapat memprediksikan apakah perubahan yang berimplikasi konflik itu terjadi secara gradual. Atau sebaliknya pelbagai faktor yang berkelindan (interacting factors) seperti deforestasi (penggundulan hutan) dan minimnya energi alternatif akan menjadikan ancaman itu cenderung dekat.
Sebagai event politik, meliput acara Musyawarah Nasional (Munas) atau Musyawarah Nasional (Mukernas) PKS tidaklah cukup menarik. Karena peristiwa nasional itu berlangsung tanpa dinamika, gejolak ataupun memiliki magnitude berita. Tidak ada protes para kader atau pemboikatan salah satu utusan daerah disepanjang acara. Semuanya tampak given dan telah disiapkan jauh-jauh hari. Ada proses politik namun proses itu telah diselesaikan sebelumnya dan jauh dari hiruk politik politik. Ada acara-acara terbuka yang dapat diikuti masyarakat namun juga ada acara yang tertutup dan seoenuhnya behind closed door. Karena itu, seorang Indonesianis, Greg Fealy mengeluhkan bahwa PKS masih menjalankan politik upstage dan backstage.
Dampaknya memang, tidak banyak media yang tertarik menjadikan headline dalam berita mereka atau meliput ‘live’ dalam program nasionalnya. Acara nasional yang digelar PKS tidak lebih merupakan ajang 'konsolidasi ideologis' para kader partai dan menjadi festival politik yang disetting professional dan entertaining.
Namun sebagai sebuah event politik, acara Munas atau Mukernas sangat menarik karena dua hal. Pertama, Acara nasional itu menjadi konsolidasi ideologis bagi semua jajaran elit PKS dari pusat hingga daerah. Acara yang disiapkan secara professional ini menjadi ‘daya ungkit’ bagi konsolidasi dan mobilitas ideologis para petinggi partai yang hadir sehingga dapat mengirimkan pesan ideologi yang kuat kepada jajaran PKS di daerah. Mulai dari musik pengiring disepanjang acara, gema takbir, lighting yang ditata apik, klip-klip film tentang PKS yang menggelorakan semangat dan tidak lupa pidato politik favorit ideolog PKS dan sekaligus sebagai ketua majelis Syuro yang menggugah dan inspiratif tentang Islam dan Indonesia. (Sayangnya pesan jenial beliau tentang Islam dan Indonesia ini tidak terbuka untuk umum). Semua paket itu tak pelak menggugah dan semakin memperkuat kesadaran ideologis kader yang hadir pada satu sisi dan pada sisi lain membuka cakrawala kesadaran publik tentang PKS yang berbeda.
Kedua, peristiwa itu menjadi ajang komunikasi peradaban yang ditawarkan PKS. PKS sejak awal menegaskan diri sebagai partai politik yang mencitakan terbentuknya masyarakat sipil Islam (Religously based civil society). Mengutip Azumardi Azra, cita-cita politik PKS adalah obyektifikasi tertinggi partai ini tentang ide keislaman dalam konteks keindonesiaan yang dapat diterima pelbagai kalangan. PKS telah memformulasikan gagasan dan ide tersebut dalam dua dokumen politik, yakni filsafat perjuangan dan platform kebijakan pembangunan partai. Kedua dokumen politik ini menjadi landasan filosofis dan praksis program dan kebijakan PKS. Mantan Menkeu, Sri Mulyani setelah membaca dokumen tersebut berkomentar bahwa PKS adalah partai politik Islam modern yang friendly market.
Apa relevansinya formulasi dokumen politik itu dalam ajang Mukernas di Yogya. Ada setidaknya dua isu utama pemilihan tempat Yogya sebagai ajang Munas dan upaya transformasi serius nilai-nilai Islam dalam konteks keindonesiaan. Yogya sebagai simbol preservasi kultural dijadikan ajang dan festival politik PKS atas upayanya yang tidak kenal henti untuk membumikan nilai-nilai keislaman yang rahmatan lil alamin dalam ceruk keindonesiaan. Dalam pandangan Fealy, PKS telah melakukan serangkaian seleksi, apropriasi dan indegenisasi (pribumisasi) sehingga ajaran Islam dapat diterima masyarakat dan tersublimasi dalam praktek ketaatan masyarakat lokal. PKS secara jenial memahami Islam lebih dari sekedar adaptasi kultural Timur Tengah –sebagaimana dipahami sekelompok umat Islam. Namun diatas itu, PKS melakukan tranformasi Islam sebagai cara pandang dunia (worldview) yang modern, komprehensif dan humanis.
Upaya-upaya tersebut sejatinya secara sosiologis telah dilakukan sejak masa era 80-an. Kelompok aktivis Islam yang terinspirasi gerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin melakukan proses transformasi dan adaptasi sosial dan kultural nilai-nilai Islam dalam kehidupan masyarakat. Di sector pendidikan-misalnya- Pelbagai lembaga pendidikan yang didirikan para kader PKS di era 90-an kini menjadi lembaga dan institusi pendidikan yang diminati masyarakat. Ribuan lembaga pendidikan yang ber-benchmark SD-SMP dan SMA-IT (Islam Terpadu) bertebaran di tanah air. Institusi ini secara faktual telah menjadi alternatif bagi keluarga Indonesia yang memimpikan integrasi antara kecerdasan dan kesalihan. Hal yang sebelumnya hanya dimiliki lembaga-lembaga Nasrani yang diuntungkan oleh akuisisi institusi pendidikan pasca kolonialisme.
Di sektor budaya, PKS membangun generasi baru budayawan dan seniman yang kreatif namun mencintai Islam. Jaringan penulis yang tergabung dalam Forum Lingkar Pena menjadi trend setter bagi pecinta novel di Indonesia. Karya-karya mereka menjadi best seller dan sangat diminati di tanah air. Publik Indonesia ditawari produk budaya yang menghibur namun mendidik. Gairah keislaman itu kemudian merambah dunia perfilman. Karya pertama Habiburahman dalam Ayat-Ayat Cinta menjadi box office dan dikabarkan menjadi film pertama yang mampu menggeser dominasi film-film Hollywood disepanjang sejarah perfileman Indonesia. Sejak itu, film-film serupa seperti Ketika Cinta Bertasbih dan sekuelnya bertumbuhan dan tetap menjadi box office ditanah air. Kehadiran mereka memecah imej film Indonesia yang didominasi mistik dan pornografi. PKS dikabarkan secara insitusional juga mendorong para kadernya menghadiri gedung-gedung bioskop untuk menonton film-film tersebut.
Geliat yang sama juga terjadi di dunia musik. Pelbagai kelompok musik yang lahir dari rahim gerakan dakwah ini bermunculan menawarkan pelbagai aliran musik dari yang bersifat etnik (Jawa) hingga kontemporer atau blend (campuran) dari keduanya. Pelbagai grup ini banyak eksis dalam blantika musik di Indonesia kendati diakui belum menjadi arus utama. Setidaknya kiprah mereka mempengaruhi bangkitnya segmentasi tertentu musik-musik religi di kalangan musisi Indonesia disaat Ramadhan dan perayaan hari-hari besar Islam.
Mukernas II tampaknya disetting sebagai deklarasi dan penguatan jati diri partai sebagai kekuatan politik dan kultural asli Indonesia, yang hadir dan tumbuh di tengah masyarakat. Mereka bukannya sebagai kekuatan politik cangkokan dalam kehidupan masyarakat Indonesia. PKS hendakmerepresentasikan diri mereka sebagai tonggak kebangkitan kalangan muda Islamis yang pada satu sisi akrab dengan modernitas, mencintai budayanya sendiri. Dua hal yang menjadi pesan utama PKS dalam platform politiknya, yakni mengedepankan kekinian (kemampuan beradaptasi dengan modernitas dan kedisinian (penghormatan kepada local wisdom).
Dalam hemat saya, pelbagai acara yang disajikan sepenuhnya merefleksikan semangat tersebut. Mulai dari pentas pentas tari topeng anak-anak lereng Merapi yang memadukan unsur gamelan Jawa, shalawatan dengan gerak tari suku Indian. Pagelaran sendratari Ramayana dalam lakon Hanoman Obong yang para penari perempuannya memakai jilbab, pagelaran sendratari yang dimaikan langsung oleh adik Sultan Hamengkubuwono X yang mengisahkan patriotisme Trunojoyo melawan Kompeni hingga operet anak-anak kader PKS yang yang kreatif, mendidik namun sarat kritik sosial. Di bagian penutupan, Ki Slamet Gundolo memainkan pagelaran wayang rumput yang simple, berupa tokoh pewayangan yang dibuat dari pilinan rumput kering dan kolaborasi tarian kontemporer dengan musik tradisional gamelan yang dikemas secara rancak dan menarik untuk membawakan pesan-pesan politik PKS.
Dan Yogyakarta menjadi tempat yang pas untuk membawa pesan Islam rahmatan lil Alamin tersebut. Jika PKS sebelumnya dikenal sebagai kelompok Islam modernism aka kini, PKS tidak canggung beradaptasi dengan kehidupan dan nilai-nilai tradisional.
Mukernas menjadi puncak transformasi nilai-nilai Islam yang moderat, penuh kasih sayang, mencintai keindahan dan membawa semangat perdamaian. Dalam sebuah kesempatan, Greg Fealy memuji pidato politik Ustadz Hilmi Aminuddin yang visioner tentang Islam dan Indonesia. Dalam pandangannya, pidato ini sekelas dengan pandangan politik para tokoh Indonesia terdahulu dan sangat penting bagi arah Indonesia di masa depan. Dalam executive summary-nya kepada pemerintah Australia, dia berkesimpulan bahwa eksistensi PKS tidak berbahaya bagi Australia serta menyarankan pemerintah Australia berinteraksi dengan kekuatan Islamis terbesar di Indonesia ini.
This paper provides an analysis on the PKS Competitiveness, their strategies and its interaction with the Government of Indonesia (GOI) using Porter’s Diamond and J Curve frameworks with effort to smooth and to sustain their policy reform process. In the first section, it will analyze the background of PKS movement and analyze their competitiveness and their strategies movement in Indonesia political world. The second part will examine the PKS interaction and their impacts to the GOI. The third section will give recommendation for the PKS activities in the future to overcome and to sustain the PKS movement and conclude their role in the Indonesian political development.
PKS Movement
PKS Background
PKS is based on the campus and school dakwah (the propagation/preaching of Islamic faith) movement which arose in the late 1970s and expand their movement to NGO social service during 1980s-1990s base on adoption of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) strategy movement. After they founded KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union), as a one of “avant-garde” of student movement which took active role in the reformation movement during 1998s, they established their “new face” as a new political party, the Justice Party on July 20, 1998, with Dr Nurmahmudi Ismail as its first president. The Justice Party was reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party in April 2003 after the Justice Party failed to meet the required two percent of electoral threshold in the 1999 election that it needed to contest the 2004 election.
During the 2004 legislative elections with Dr M Hidayat Nur Wahid as its second president (now is the Chairman of the MPR RI), using “clean and caring” campaign with their constant incorruptible legislators and their active involvement in providing community service, the PKS won 7.3% of the popular vote and 45 out of 550 seats, making it the seventh-largest party in Indonesia parliament. For the 2009 elections, with Ir Tifatul Sembiring as its third president, the PKS set their target to get at least 20 % of the popular vote legislative election which will act as a base to support its own president candidate in the presidential election.
PKS (also its former party: PK) declares from the beginning that their party is different from other party because PKS is “dakwah party” which means their primary goal is the promotion of Islam and uses it as a foundation of their policies . Besides that, they also states that PKS organization principle is “al hizb huwal jama’ah – al jama’ah huwal hizb” which means that the party is jama’ah (religious organization) and jama’ah is the party.
Different from other Islamist parties, PKS leaders have often spoken of their support for a society based on “the Madinah Charter”, an agreement between the Muslim community led by the Prophet Muhammad and the non Muslim citizens of the Madinah city. They believed that the Madinah Charter is preferable to the Jakarta Charter because it has been proven to work in a pluralistic society and provides guarantees for non Muslim citizens base on the same principles as a Muslims citizens like equality, rule of law, and justice.
PKS Competitiveness and Strategies
PKS’s competitiveness in Indonesia political condition were analyze base on Porter’sDiamond framework which has been modified and focusing on PKS’s performance in which PKS develop their identity, resources, capabilities, and managerial styles. To sustain its competitive advantage, PKS requires good practice not only in their operational effectiveness, but also in their dynamic advantage that they must broaden and extend the basis of their competitive advantage by constantly innovate and upgrade their performance. The Porter’s Diamond consists of PKS factors condition; PKS strategy and rivalry; PKS demands condition; and PKS supporting and related institution as describes in Exhibit 1. PKS’s openness and stability were analyze base on modified J Curve framework which has been modified and focusing on the notion that PKS are stable either because they are open or because they are closed as describes in Exhibit 2.
Elizabeth Collinsargues that PKS leadership has largely succeeded achieving good image as the party of moral reform while engaged in pragmatic politics and good choice as moderate Islamist party, but they have not yet found a way to extend their base to organized labor, peasants and unemployed poor. This paper will show that after 2004, her judgment about PKS success is not accurate anymore, PKS has change in terms of their decreasing image as the party of moral reform (as a result of their involvement in the ruling government); constant as a moderate Islamist party but has expanded their base to organized labor, peasants and unemployed poor.
PKS Factors Condition
PKS have a strong Islamic ideology which inspired from MB movements (especially their ideology and recruitment strategies) and they had about 500 000 members in 2005 with special characterized: clean, young, educated, loyal, and committed members. They also had broad organizations structure in every province and district in Indonesia and every “kecamatan” in Java. Differ fro other parties, PKS had many regular activities including continuous recruitment, training, development social and humanitarian service which not depend on election term cycle.
PKS members are known of their homogeny style as a result of their “tarbiyah” (refers to the Islamic education process in which PKS member join a small circles groups (halaqah) where they taught about the Islamic values and its implementation in their daily life including discuss party programs) activities and mostly have urban background as a result of their higher education, less in the rural areas.
Their organization weaknesses are: first, they tend to be a modern party organization but they do not use performance base and activity base costing in their activities. Secondly, their ideology has been perceived as transnational ideology which not base on Indonesian culture or tradition. Thirdly, they only have a little funding, mainly from members and only a little portion from private-public sectors. Fourth, there is little involvement of a new prominent person from outside party organization. As a result, they only have modest expertise to plan and implement their movement to the “real world”.
PKS Strategy and Rivalry
After Soeharto era, GOI regulation has been favoring democracy with permitting “multy party” model and “free press” in their democracy. There is competition between political parties with different ideology. PKS gain benefit from the weaknesses in others political parties which still deal with old problems: their corrupt culture; “traditional” party; and least activities (only have activities during election campaign). Compare to other parties, PKS relatively well organized in their “fighting programs” (program perjuangan) which change every five years following Indonesia election cycle.
PKS always has been suspect of their possibility to implement Sharia law to move Indonesia in the direction towards Islamic state. After 2004 election, PKS clear and caring platform has been diminish, not only because their involvement in the ruling government (where it took unpopular decision to raise fuel prices and its association with the GOI’s ineffectiveness and corruptibility), but also their zigzags towards governor, mayor or regent candidates election with no visible common political and no common standard track records background . PKS starting act as an opportunistic political party which supports anyone who might get into power.
PKS’s legislators and executives have weakness in making, implement, evaluate public policy concept. They tend to have difficulties in transform their Islamist and populist idea to be a bills, laws, and regulations. PKS also have weakness in making stable alliance with others institutions including Islamic base organization like Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah, and Persatuan Islam which perceive that PKS will take their “traditional” grassroots and infiltrate their institutions.
At the same time, PKS has more intense competition from other Islamist base organization like Hizbut Tahrir and Salafiy movements which tend to do the same mass recruitment in the schools and campuses that has been base of PKS movement’s. This condition has been worsen with terrorism issues and Islamist radicalism in which PKS still do not have clear position. Another issues is unity of others political parties especially nationalist parties to challenge PKS movement in the provincial and regional elections. The last but not the least is PKS less capability in dealing with mass media relation and public opinion which resulted in their decreasing image.
PKS Demands Condition
Again, after Soeharto era, Indonesian tends to have more demand to stop the “KKN” (acronym of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism) which benefit PKS as a new party who perceived consistent to fight the KKN. Besides that, Indonesian also tends to say enough to status quo element which again benefit PKS as a new party who consist of “new kids in the block” in the political arena. But these advantages can not easily combine to be a winning factor for PKS because they also have less capability to overcome the Indonesia social economic problem and have problem with their consistency in fighting the KKN. After 2004 election, massive publication about PKS legislators and PKS executives who succeed in fighting against corruption is not heard anymore, compare to its successive campaign about it before 2004 election.
PKS platform and program only understood by a moderate professional in middle class. Their platform also not been actively discuss in the public arena and challenge with other political parties platform. Except their intention to act base on Islamic values, their platform can only have little portion that really distinguished them from their competitors and rarely fought around the issues of fiscal policy and economic management that often dominate political debate in the West. Another challenge is “temptation” to tolerate other PKS members who became legislators and executives in the ruling government and to maintain stable alliance. At the same time, PKS social activities have been copied by other parties and institutions. As a result, to gain more voters and support from citizens, PKS need to act not only base on “charity” activities, but also “advocating” and “empowering” activities like continue to fight the KKN and be professional in their public roles.
PKS Supporting and Related Institutions
As a dakwah party, PKS had many direct or indirect affiliate dakwah institutions in campuses, schools, and many social services institutions in society which act as sources of recruitment and activities. Its ranging from KAMMI, LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Campus Dakwah Institution) and LDS (Lembaga Dakwah Sekolah or School Dakwah Institution) which PKS only have indirect influence from its activist (they activist always change every years) to dakwah institutions like Khairu Ummah, Ma’had al Hikmah in Jakarta or Ma’had al Qud’wah in Depok which PKS have direct influence. PKS also controlled the student councils of many Indonesia’s largest and most prestigious state universities.
PKS also have many cadres and members who active in PKPU (Pos KeadilanPeduli Ummat or the National Humanitarian Foundation), BSMI (Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia or Indonesian Red Crescent), JSIT (Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu or Integrated Islamic School), and ISTECS (Institute for Science and Technology Studies) which spread across Indonesia. They not only use these dakwah network to provide social service but also used and continued to be used as the key in recruiting members for PKS.
Despite have affiliation with many institutions above, PKS only have a little and small professional organization and think-thank institutions which is not the case in other Islamist movement like MB in Egypt who have a lot of it. Their dakwah institutions mostly consist of homogeny institutions not heterogenic institutions, therefore its influence is limited. They also weak in the business network empowerment which base on professionalism not base on politics/KKN.
PKS Openness
PKS membership is open to Indonesian but new member should oath to the God and to the Prophet to be a good activist in their activities. They also have non Muslim at their regional board in a largely non Muslim province like Irian Jaya, Sulawesi Utara and Nusa Tenggara Timur which demonstrates that PKS is tolerant of non Muslims and their right to express their views and be involved in politics.
As a cadre’s organization, PKS’s members should establish strong record of tarbiyah involvement, to service their community and also showing detailed knowledge of PKS ideology and policies. In the PKS tarbiyah process, the new members should start from anggota pemula (beginning member), anggota muda (young member), anggota madya (intermediate member), anggota dewasa (mature member) and anggota ahli (expert member) which each duration length process ranging from 2-5 years for each stage.
As a result of their tarbiyah process, it’s difficult to engage prominent persons into PKS because they have to start from the beginning. To accommodate this situation, PKS leaders established Dewan Pakar (Advisory Council of Expert for the Party) in February 2004 who is to advise the young leaders of PKS on political, economic and social issues . But the tarbiyah processes also have been concern of PKS leaders as a trade off between their position as cadre’s based party or as mass bases party strategies which can change and resulted in different form of their organization process.
PKS Stability
As a dakwah party which have “al hizb huwal jama’ah – al jama’ah huwal hizb” as organization principles (it means that for the cadre’s, the party is their jama’ah/religious organization and jama’ah is their party), PKS is well known of their well organized by cadres. Their cadres will follow whatever their leaders decided to which known as “sami’na wa atho’na” principle (we listen and we obey), as long as it do not violate Islamic values which resulted in the militancy of their cadres.
Their highest institution is the Consultative Council (Majelis Syuro) which sets the party vision and elects the party’s Central Board, Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat and Dewan Syariah Pusat. Members of the Consultative Council are in turn elected by senior cadres called “core member” which reflects Lenin’s notion of “the democratic centralism” (whereby rank and file members are strictly subordinate to the leadership, decision making is to be central in formulation with rank and file members copying out orders received but higher bodies are to be democratically accountable to the membership at periodic meetings) to project the power of an ideological perspective into the political arena.
III. PKS Interaction with the GOI and Its Impact
Since founded, PKS and its former party PK, always uses massive dakwah movement in schools and campuses which resulted in new Islamic culture in Indonesia such as many young women wear long headscarves, many children study Al Qur’an and Islamic text and many men in PKS do not smoke. PKS is the first party after “orde baru” which use Islam as ideology. After 1999 election, despite its small votes (only 1.36 % of the vote), they actively involved in the “poros tengah” (central axis) which appeared to prevent Megawati becoming President and succeeded in making Abdurrahman Wahid as a President and Amien Rais as a Chairman of MPR. After that, in October 1999, Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail was appointed as a Minister of forestry and resigned as a PK President and in their National Syuro on Mei 2000, PKS elected Dr M Hidayat Nur Wahid as a new PK President.
During his leadership, PKS made several unique characteristic such as: it’s known of their peaceful and well ordered capability in organizing several big mass demonstrations which get more sympathize from public; they also actively engaged in the social activity and “search and rescue” programs such as flood, natural disaster, or accident like fire; and their also actively involved in Sharia implementation at several region like Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Cianjur, Bekasi and so on.
Based on that special characteristics combine with successful campaign of Clear and Caring jargon on issues of corruption and good governance proved by their legislative member and their executive minister (Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail and Suripto in Minister of Forestry) during 1999-2004 era; their moderate views; also their ability to avoid major corruption scandals or internal party conflict; and their militant members active participation, during 2004 election they was the only party that contested in the 1999 elections who make major gains in the 2004 parliamentary elections, lifting its vote to 7.3 % to have 1100 member of legislative in central and local government.
After that, they involved in the “Koalisi Kerakyatan” which support President SBY and succeeded making Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid as a Chairman of MPR. In the Cabinet, PKS also get several ministerial position: Dr Anton Apriyantono as a Minister of Agriculture, M Yusuf Asyari MSi as a Minister of People’s Housing, and Dr Adhyaksa Dault as a Minister of Youth and Sport.
IV. Recommendation and Conclusion
Recommendation for the PKS activities in the Future Based on analysis above, PKS problem tree analyses are describe in Exhibit 3. To overcome their challenge and problem above, there are several proposals for PKS management process reform to smooth and to sustain its implementation base on the 7-S Framework, which are:
1.Strategy, the PKS leaders has to act quickly and decisive to get public acceptance and public confidence before 2009 election. Besides that, the PKS leaders should establish new internal commission which have strong investigatory powers and also work to prevent internal incompetence and ineffective activities, not just to find but punish those caught at being corrupt. They also have to work closely with PKS members to sustain their effort to take a leading role in Indonesia political in order to implement justice and give prosperous to Indonesian peoples.
2.Structure, PKS should use of divisional organization form or matrix organization form which designed to react quickly and effectively to threats and opportunities related to its focus (e.g. to overcome PKS incompetent and ineffective management process problems). To achieve its strategy, PKS will focuses on three corresponding functions, which are the operation function which analyze, propose, implement and evaluate daily activities; the internal commission which carry out the vulnerability assessment and deal with it; and the community relation function which gather support and information from the public.
3.Systems, to insure it’s clear and caring in the internal organization practices, PKS should conduct heavy rewards and punishment systems. PKS should establish renewable contracts of one year and make sure that renewal is base on effective performance of their executive and legislative members. Besides that, PKS should have internal commission unit that have power to scrutiny their officers to raise the risk of being caught and to reduce incentive to do incompetent and ineffective activities.
4.Staffing, to get public’s support and confidence, PKS should recruit their executives, legislatives, and Central Board members base on solely of their capability (skills) and credibility (honesty and integrity). The new recruits of their executives and legislatives members should be inquiry to intense their background checks.
5.Skills, PKS officers should be train by the expert from other “best” organizations including business organizations to study and to apply most advanced skills, techniques and equipments in dealing with management of modern organization.
6.Style, to get involved in something as sensitive as the organization reforms, PKS leaders and officers should act as a truly professional (expert, skilled, and even certified) and work together with other PKS affiliate institutions and with PKS member in doing their job to impress and to get support from all of Indonesian citizenry.
7.Shared Values, to fulfill its mission to reform PKS incompetent and ineffective management process, PKS should conceptualize their mission in three parts, which are they will raise the risk of being caught on corruption, they will recommend the reorganize of PKS bureaucracies to reduce opportunities of incompetent and ineffective, and they will raise the moral costs of being incompetent and ineffective. PKS also have to spread their anti incompetent and ineffective messages and values to the public with new jargon: “Clear, Caring, and Professional” through of mass media involvement including TV advertisement, radio programs, and special pamphlets.
To support the assessment above, there are several recommendations of PKS incompetent and ineffective management process reform to smooth its implementation base on 3C2M Framework, which are:
1.Communications, do not forget to prepare information materials about the incompetent and ineffective management reform process in various ways: starts from policy briefs documents, policy options agenda, and press releases in multimedia to assure that their management process reforms can be recognize and get full support from various stakeholders. To support communications in their management process reform, PKS leaders should approach their officers, cadres, and members with transparency in providing sufficient background, its technical underpinning and the explanation of proposed management reforms.
2.Champions, to introduce and get attention in their management process reform justification, PKS need credible spokespersons from various backgrounds including their top leaders, religious key person, prominent management process experts, outstanding “murobbi” (tarbiyah teachers), and even their nasyid (religious singer) stars. These champions can break the initial barriers to communicate their management process reform and to provide more complex and technical information.
3.Coalitions, in every reform and change, there are supporters of status quo who feel their will lose in the management process reform. If PKS reformists do not prepare to make counter coalition to balance the status quo, PKS reformist will lose the management process reform. After PKS reformists made the management process reform coalition, it will help PKS reformists position in the dialogue and discussion about it. PKS reformists can offer the opponent of the management process reform to be part of the management process reform review committee. This can reduced the tension between proponent and opponent off the management process reform.
4.Mobilizations, to support and maintain the coalition and management process reform, PKS need an imaginative and participative employment of advocacy groups including various task forces, advisory groups, and steering committees which can build consensus in each province and region. To boost the credibility and capability of the management process reform, PKS need to conduct various meetings such as conferences, seminars, public hearings, summits, consultations, and workshop. These events also can create good publication and public opinion to back up PKS position. 5. Managements of Perceptions, to make management process reform succeed, PKS need assurance from their top leaders to always support management process reform. These can make mass media role easier in shaping public opinion to support the management process reform because there is unity of view of PKS top leaders.
Conclusion: PKS Role in the Indonesian Political Development
To be effective in dealing with PKS incompetent and ineffective management process reform, PKS must have a high degree of fit or well aligned among these 7-C elements (internal alignment) that is each S is consistent with and reinforces the other S’s. Besides that, PKS also should stay aligned with their external environment including the GOI, other GOI institutions and Indonesian citizenry to get their sustain support to overcome PKS incompetent and ineffective management process problems.
A Socio-political landscape has dramatically changed after the New Order regime stepped down. Since 1989 till now many new politicians and a new relatively different-approach community building entity –compared with the type of community relation in the previous era- appeared and were crystallized.
Indonesia is still in transition for a decade and span of two elections which give a relatively new changing sign. In 1999 election, PDIP (Struggle-Indonesian Democratic Party) became a winner’s party and sparked a hope that a progressive political force would lead the nation despite the new political coalition at the time already yielded a weak government due to a very dynamic political interplay.
2004 election drove a new and unpredicted political force when a small to middle political parties’ coalition, i.e. Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) and PBB (Crescent and and Star Party) successfully put Susilo Bambang Yudoyono as a new elected-Indonesian president. Once a loose coalition, however, resulted in a weak government. But first time in Indonesian political history, Golkar may not earn dominantly in its current coalition meanwhile PDIP determined as an opposition party. However, the national political environment is generally conducive for the emergence of some new political players.
2009 election will yield similarly as 2004. A national survey conducted by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in July 2008 revealed if the election is conducted now, it will result with five national biggest political parties, consecutively PDIP (20,3%), Golkar (18,3%), PKS/Prosperous Justice Party (11,8), PKB (6,8%) and PD (5,2%). The awakening of PKS among top political parties below PDIP and Golkar has been consistently predicted since previous 2004 election.
In 2004 election PD and PKS became two rising stars amidst their different wakening backgrounds (Sapto Waluyo, 2005). If PD garnered votes among a pragmatic middle urban class with support of military-based family, PKS favored Islamic (santri) middle-urban class background. In general, it demonstrates that Indonesian voters are getting more deliberate and rationale in determining their political inclination. In other word, Indonesian democratic quality tends to increase.
Domestic Outlook
PKS phenomenon has drawn an attention of –especially- many domestic researchers. Indonesian expected that there were any radical changes in the beginning of reform era, but the protracted transition wasted the hope. Hence, an emergence of new and consistent political players is highly expected. The first research that broadly analyzed the appearance of PKS is of a young researcher, Ali Said Damanik. He wrote the social origin of the campus-based party.
The spread of any campus-based underground Islamist meeting that became a model in 1980s under New Order’s oppressive regime transformed into a formal Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus’s Islamic Proselytizing Institution). At critical time, the regime change, it again transformed into a student’s pressure group, namely KAMMI (United Action of Islamic Students), recalling a legendary student association, so called KAMI at the regime change of Sukarno has shown itself a brilliant political initiative. Its Islamist students and a nationwide campus-based network made its appearance became a significantly important at the time.
Interestingly, he not only chronicled the emergence of PKS as a consequence of a battle of thought in campus, tracked down its socially-rooted bases, namely ‘Gerakan Tarbiyah’ community (education movement) as well. It successfully developed a myriad Islamic-colored institutions from educational institution (Nurul Fikri Foundation, Ma’had al-Hikmah etc), publishing (Rabbani, Syaamil, I’tishom Press etc), magazines (Ummi, Saksi etc) till political think tank (SIDIK Foundation).
With its socially-based track, the PKS emergence is not actually extraordinary or natural in the eye of Indonesian Islamic movement history. Indonesian people already witnessed the birth of Muhammadiyah organization that stemmed from the process of small Islamic meeting (pengajian) around Masjid Kauman, Yogyakarta, 1912 (Mitsuo Nakamura, 1983 and James L. Peacock, 1978) as well as of Nahdlatul Ulama organization as a result of cultural movement and yellow-scripture (Kitab Kuning) based Islamic study in Pesantren (Islamic boarding) around Java Island in 1926. Based on logic of social change, the emergence of an Islamic political party is in normalcy if fostered by a modernist campus-based group.
The other author (Aay Muhammad Furkon, 2004) sought to track down PKS’ Hasan al Banna (the founder of Moslem Brotherhood, Egypt) inspired- ideological root and political practices. The political situation around 1980s was likely to enable a massive cross-border exchange of Islamic school of thought. The Islamic books from Middle East origin were boomingly translated into Indonesia and became domestically best-selling. The dissemination of Middle Eastern thought is led to a mistaken conclusion that Indonesian Islamic political party is of a side product of a global Islamist movement. If observed carefully, the wave of Islamist politics in Indonesia was a logical consequence of an Islamic proselytizing dynamic in the span of 20 years since the awakening of New Order Era.
In 1970s, the reform movement of Islamic thought was initiated by its founder, Nurkholis Madjid Along with the emergence of Islamic study group with its pioneer, Dawam Raharjo in Yogyakarta, a new stream of Islamic movement appeared in Bandung with its main mentor, namely Imadudin Abdurrahim, popularly called Bang Imad. Bang Imad designed and managed Latihan Mujahid Kampus (Campus Fighters Training) program that vigorously trained many Islamist activists from various campuses around Indonesia.
The stream of the Islamic movement heightened in 1980s with the increasing Islamic preachers not only insisted on Islam as an alternative ideology and system but criticized harshly against the Suharto regime. The figures like A.M Fatwa, Abdul Qadir Djaelani, and Tony Ardie were very popular among Islamic students and were invited to preach in various mosques, either in campuses or village’s mosques that sparked tension Islamist activists vis a vis regime that ultimately mounted many casualties –caused Tanjungpriok Tragedy in 1984 and –in turn- yielded a setback in the movement due to suppression. Many Islamic prominent figures were put in jail by Suharto’s security apparatus.
After a vacuum of oppression, Islamic proselytizing (dakwah) activities appeared again in 1990s but in more popular and fluid -not ideological- fashion. In the regard, Zainuddin M.Z –so called ‘a million audience-preacher’ became an iconic entertaining preacher. His step was followed by many Islamic preachers and eventually the model attracted level of celebrities and actresses that held the annual Ramadhan Safari or Preaching Parade from city to city. The Suharto’s political stance on Islamic activities finally got more moderate. He sponsored the formation of ICMI (Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Association) in December, 1990 and opened the celebration of Iedul Fitr Islamic Festival in National Monument accompanied by Zainuddin, Rhoma Irama, Emha Ainun Najid and several other Islamic prominent figures in February, 1997.
The initial Islamic proselytizing activities actually became an end of Suharto rule. At the critical situation, May 1989, all nine Islamic prominent figures that were trusted to form ‘Reform Committee’ in a way to save him from mounting public pressure denied the assignment. It pointed out that Islamic force may not be always able to be used to be legitimacy tool for authoritarian regime. At the end of the day, several critical Islamic force led by Amin Rais –at the time closely allied with KAMMI (embryonic PKS) that pushed the regime change could not be halted. In the context, we assume when Islamic activism has been culturally in mature or become socially-uprooted so its political emergence becomes inevitable.
The presence of PKS in contemporary Indonesian social dynamic can not be only politically measured but gives a new Islamic culture as well. We witness the appearance of very popular Islamic young preachers such as Abdullah Gymnastiar, Muhammad Arifin Ilham, Ary Ginanjar Agustian, and Jeffry al-Bukhori introduced new Islamic proselytizing approaches through programs such as soul management, zikir (remembering God) in congregation, emotional and spiritual quotient (ESQ) training, preaching in a dramaturgy or musically instrumented. These all pioneers can be carefully observed to have a close association with PKS’ activists or community. The PKS’ cadres even encouraged the birth of Islamic popular novelist generation that ultimately achieved a corpus of best-selling novel and top box-office movie, “Ayat-Ayat Cinta” (the Verses of Love). The success of new cultural wave is still underway since their corpuses are currently adapted into some mini series or wide-screens.
Thanks to its ideological flexibility and socio-cultural innovation, PKS appearance is not widely resisted from most Indonesian people, especially urban community. The new educated Moslem generation as a mix of product of reform era and globalization effect indeed required a new medium for their political aspiration. Despite some suspicions and allegations that PKS represents an anti-tradition movement or politicizing Islam but all allegations and suspicions can be revoked with any concrete actions of PKS’ community in all levels.
One of the fields that are yet researched seriously is the PKS influential role in forming a religious cultural mass, such as in music. PKS’ cadres reinvigorate Nasyid (Islamic acapella). In 1980s, nasyid among Islamic activists were directly adopted from Arabic Middle East. Their lyrics were about the struggle of Palestine and Moslem around the world. But in 1990s, nasyid evolved indigenously with appearance of local music group such as Snada that bring its lyrical songs about peace and humanity messages. In 2000’s, more varied nasyid groups developed from bossanova (Suara Persaudaraan and Justice Voice) rock (Izzatul Islam and Shoutul Harakah) till ethnical genres (Ebiet Beat A) and even shortly appeared a female nasid group, entitled Bestari. The phenomena can be viewed as PKS’ efforts to give a direction of fast evolving social change, not merely entitled for the purposes of gaining electoral voters.
In opinion of Yon Mahmudi (2005), PKS has built a new variant of convergent Islamic group (santri) when an Islamic reform movement meets a socio-political change in information era. Through its gradual Islamic educational process, PKS successfully balances between the required Islamic purification and local tradition in which these efforts are often failed to be accommodated smoothly by Islamist modernists. PKS has developed as well the moderate and inclusive Islamic outlook without trapped in debate between Islamic formalists and substantialist. In his PhD thesis, Yon Machmudi argued that PKS political agenda can not be deemed a threat for plural Indonesian people. Otherwise, PKS practically brings about a new spirit for a concrete social action for Indonesian people indiscriminately.
Some observers perhaps have a suspicion that PKS has a hidden political agenda, i.e. imposing Islamic Syari’ah. However, Nandang Baharuddin (2004) explained that PKS had a distinct perspective of implementing Syari’ah. Syariah can not be merely understood as a legal product but consists of improvement of individual morality, family capacity building, and collective behavioral change. Hence, PKS’ mission to campaign a clean (freedom of corruption) and caring (of people agony) movement was conceptualized as a part of Syariah values. With its current slogan,’ Clean, Caring and Professional’, PKS not only developed personal and social piety but technical competence as well. The last factor is seldom noticed and developed among Islamic parties which generate the thesis developed by Oliver Roy about the failure of political Islam when in power.
Foreign Outlook
If domestic observers analyzed in curiosity how Campuses’ small Islamic groups may play a significant role in contemporary politics in Indonesia after reform, otherwise mostly foreign observers look up the link between PKS and the other global Islamic movements. Unfortunately, there is no serious research to seriously map out the new political player within contemporary Indonesian politics about the issue, except the various comments from international media so the observers still defined the feature of contemporary Indonesian Islam based on old and simple division of a mix of two mainstreams between Islamic modernists of Muhammadiyyah and traditionalist of Nahdlatul Ulama. Moreover, a new Moslem generation has cultivated a cross-border experience and knowledge so it is difficult to include the generation in a previously clear social category. The PKS’ presence is relatively new and likely to be considered unimportant due to mostly ill-experienced young generation. PKS is also negatively viewed not having a wide social basis and a saliently track political record. On the onset, the misperception begins.
The most extreme outlook was conveyed by Zachary Abuza that put PKS as one of variant Islamic political groups with the mission of imposing Islamic Syari’ah in pluralistic-democratic Indonesia. Impliedly, Abuza contended that PKS had a likelihood of greater mission, i.e. hidden agenda to form an Islamic state in Indonesia and reinvigorate the creation of regional Islamic caliphate in South East Asia. Based on the allegation, PKS was intentionally put in a similar box with other Islamic movements such as Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia, Hizbut Tahrir (HTI) and even Jamaah al-Islamiyyah (JI). The PKS appearance as observed by Abuza is just tactically different with the rest due to the absence of violence. It is a serious misunderstanding because Abuza can not differentiate between -outside mainstream- Islamic movements and Islamic parties that abide by constitution as well as differentiate between ideologically violent-movements and anti-violent Islamic parties or between state apparatus engineered group and externally driven violent group.
A similar outlook was opined by Sadanand Dhume, ex journalist once assigned in Indonesia and wrote a book entitled,” My Friend the Fanatic: Travel with Indonesian Islamist” based on his travel around many cities and meeting with some Indonesian Islamic organization activist. He gave a red notice that democratization process in Indonesia is in danger because Islamic political party used the democratic procedure to kill democracy someday if in power. How he came to a conclusion but his negative image was unfairly linked with the violent phenomena in Algeria after 1992 election won by the Islamic Salvation Front. He sought to support his weak arguments with some side issues of the implementation of Syari’ah favored local regulations –mistakenly associated with PKS initiatives and the PKS’ support on the draft of anti pornography bill.
Some issue must be addressed, especially about the issue of imposing Islamic Syariah as PKS’ hidden agenda. As explained before, PKS views Syariah is not merely a legal construct-limitedly a criminal law but is viewed in wide perspectives that encompass the management of whole aspects of life, starting from individual, family to society. In a contemporary Indonesian politics, PKS bluntly defined that eradication of corruption and graft and the increase of Indonesian wealth and prosperity are a part of Syari’ah implementation.
In its official document released in 2008, PKS reasserts its main goal,” to implement a prosperous and just civil society (masyarakat madani) that was blessed by the God in the shade of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)”. A civil society is then formulated as an advanced and high civilized society based on values, norms and moral underpinning of faith, respect of plurality, inclusiveness, democracy and cooperation to defend the state sovereignty. In that sense, PKS blends the genuine definition of civil society in the context of three fraternity bonds, i.e. Islamic fraternity (ukhuwwah Islamiyyah), national fraternity (ukhuwwah wathoniyyah) and human fraternity (ukhuwwah basyariyyah).
Ideologically, there is no fundamental difference between PKS and mainstream Islamic movements. There is no aspiration for formation of Islamic theocratic state or middle-aged world government. PKS does appreciate any universal Islamic values in contemporary Indonesian context through method of objectification of all sectors of life.
An objective observation was offered by Greg Fealy (in Mahmudi, 2005). He contended the requirement of new framework, since PKS applied Islamic a political approach that never existed in Indonesian history. Fealy analyzed four PKS’ advantages: Firstly, PKS adopted foreign inspired ideological source. Secondly, the only genuine cadres based political party. Thirdly, the party owned an effective wide social network. Fourthly, raising the morality in political life is as its main program. The characteristic successfully garnered public support from 1.4 percent of popular voters in 1999 election to 7.3 percent in 2004 election and expected to increase up to 10 percent in 2009 election.
Elizabeth Collin saw a similar indication (2004) that leadership of PKS successfully attained a positive image as a moral reform-based and moderate Islamic political party while keep involving in a pragmatic politics. Not many Islamic political entities successfully remained consistent in meeting moral challenge and political pragmatism so the future of the party will be still tested. But Collin concluded that PKS has no way to expand its basis of support from labors and rural-based farmers so its greater role of political change is still unsurely predicted. Both positive and negative outlooks will become a historical test case of PKS. The current challenge confronting PKS right now, whether PKS will successfully go beyond historical threshold of 20 percent as previously cultivated by Masyumi in 1955 election?
Expanding Its Social Bases
The answer of the challenging question very much relies on political practices of PKS in transforming its vision and mission as well managing its potential core cadres and constituents. As an initial study case, it can be referring to the PKS victory in West Java and North Sumatera province. In West Java, PKS allied with PAN (National Mandate Party) successfully lapsed the long time dominance of Golkar and PDIP in the province. Meanwhile, under coalition with PPP (Development and Unity Party) and PBB (Crescent and Star Party) in North Sumatera, PKS crippled Golkar and PDIP in their traditional bases as well. Those two spectacular victories reflected the PKS ability to garner Islamic modernist voters.
Meanwhile in NTB Province, it achieved the remarkable victory with coalition with PBB supported by a biggest Islamic traditionalists’ organization, so called Nahdlatul Wathan in surrounding Lombok Island. The political experiments conducted by PKS are not certainly the only standard but PKS, at least, has demonstrated its wider acceptability in both modernists-urban and traditionalist-rural community. If these political experiences are reflected and formulated into an appropriate strategy, the obstacles of PKS to attract a rural-traditionalist segment in East and Central Java so far can be addressed.
The next question that is likely to appear as a consequence of its expanding social bases is how PKS maintain its plurality among membership and constituents. A simple question but is not easily addressed because PKS is generally overviewed among observers as a very homogeneous political party characterized in a centralistic leadership. In the regard, many facts are not publicly known so far. The founding board of PK (the former PKS) actually consisted of very different-background figures from traditionalists to modernists spectrum. The traditionalists are represented by figures such as DR. Daud Rasyid Sitorus and DR. Salim Segaf al-Jufry (the grandson of founder of al Washliyah), the late Rahmad Abdullah (Asy Safiiyyah), Ahmad Heriawan (the head of PUI organization), and Acep Abdus Syukur (Mathlaul Anwar). The modernists are represented by Mutammimul Ula (PII), Abdi Sumaithi (DDII), Sumanjaya Rukmandis (HMI), Makmur Hasanuddin (Persis), Yusuf Supendi (BKSPPSI). One of its 50 founders is even a Chinese ethnic Indonesian, namely Chin Kun Min from West Sumatera. The facts that are almost publicly unknown but it is likely to draw the likelihood of expanding its bases since its first formation of the party (PK). While the founding board of PKS is getting broader than its predecessor, PK. It formally formed the highest decision making institution, namely Majelis Syuro (consultative assembly) that at least held a meeting a year. It was chaired by some 99 elected-representatives from all Indonesian provinces in addition to some appointed members from both religious and professional competence-based appointees. The decision was made by the body based on an absolute agreement or voting. The body is not dominated by a certain figure or Middle East alumni as publicly – but mistakenly- perceived. Meanwhile, some domestically graduated Islamic scholars or Middle East alumni formed the body, namely Board of Syariah.
With its inclusive format, PKS may enable to recruit some wider and more different background constituents. In the regard, PKS community can be deemed a melting pot for various organizational activists and community groups that were not canalized by any formal institution. With its previously described-collective characteristics, PKS can not be defined as a genuine modernist political party, but more likely to be a representative of a transitional community when a line between traditionalism and modernism are getting blurred.
The inclusiveness of PKS is clearly indicated when PKS sets up a coalition with other Islamic parties or nationalist parties. PKS even in Moslem minority such as Papua was happily allied with Christian party, PDS (Prosperous and Peace Party) in its gubernatorial election. PKS also had some non-Muslim members of legislatives in the province. It should break the unfairly created myth as well as the black campaign that PKS is exclusively fundamentalist and not genuine Islamic party. That is why I propose that we intentionally erase the misleading dichotomy between Islamic political parties versus nationalist political parties. In Indonesian context fortunately appears the new terminology of nationalist religious party or religious-nationalist party.
The misunderstanding about Islamic political party must be cleared as referring to misassumption of AKP (the Justice and Development Party) in Turkey as militant-Islamist party while it clearly put and support secularism as its ideology. If AKP transformed the old secularism into a new one in Turkey, PKS translated the definition of nationalism into a spirit of publicly dedicated services and pioneering within Islamic universal values. The Islamic universal values are profoundly elaborated in the book, ‘Philosophy of PKS’ Struggling Foundation’, newly released in 2008. It reasserts the principles of social egalitarianism as a foundation of its promoted community development and the recognition of pluralistic culture as modality to advance. The principles are further elaborated in the book, “The Platform on Development Policy” which in socio-culture sector is aimed at restoring the national dignity as a whole. Hence, all PKS’ policies and Programs are more focused on building the stable foundation of socio-culture, i.e. the resilient, religious and culturally-disciplined civilians with trust and respect among different groups within community.
Changing Perception
With a new social base and more inclusive political outlook, the awakening of Islamic political party is not impossible in national political stage in the future. The Head of PKS’ Majelis Syuro, Hilmi Aminuddin (2008) brought about the five recipes of political advantages of PKS’ Islamic proselytizing activities as follows: 1) winning values, 2) winning concept, 3) winning system, 4) winning team, and last 5) winning goals. The winning value is more reflected in service, change, concern of nation salvation from the crisis than merely pursuance of power. The winning concept can be seen from its philosophy and policies that encompass all aspects of development community and state. The winning system is initiated by the formation of a solid organization from up to bottom level and the winning goal is the promotion of civil society that protects all encompassing people indiscriminately.
As the PKS phenomena are very little observed by observers, the Hilmi Aminuddin outlook as founding father of PKS is seldom reviewed as well. In his contemporary thought, he –a Sundanese-ethnic Islamic Scholar, explained trauma perception that must be necessarily avoided by the cadres. Every cadre strongly avoids a sense of: a) becoming a loser in battle, b) being an object of external pressure, c) assuming conspiracy mentality, d) inferiority complex, e) negative thinking, and f) imitation. Hilmi is a very rare Islamic scholar that masters any classical Islamic references but successfully articulated his Islamic ideas into an understandable language among his secularly-educated background young audiences. Even, his delicate knowledge of modern management often colored his political direction among cadres. The unique figure became strength of its ideological factor as well as its flexibility in interacting with and participating in a plural society.
With its socio-political capacity, PKS may be potentially a problem solver in the future, not a threat for national unity. Its unique position will make PKS as a new Islamic emerging force.
