A Socio-political landscape has dramatically changed after the New Order regime stepped down. Since 1989 till now many new politicians and a new relatively different-approach community building entity –compared with the type of community relation in the previous era- appeared and were crystallized.
Indonesia is still in transition for a decade and span of two elections which give a relatively new changing sign. In 1999 election, PDIP (Struggle-Indonesian Democratic Party) became a winner’s party and sparked a hope that a progressive political force would lead the nation despite the new political coalition at the time already yielded a weak government due to a very dynamic political interplay.
2004 election drove a new and unpredicted political force when a small to middle political parties’ coalition, i.e. Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) and PBB (Crescent and and Star Party) successfully put Susilo Bambang Yudoyono as a new elected-Indonesian president. Once a loose coalition, however, resulted in a weak government. But first time in Indonesian political history, Golkar may not earn dominantly in its current coalition meanwhile PDIP determined as an opposition party. However, the national political environment is generally conducive for the emergence of some new political players.
2009 election will yield similarly as 2004. A national survey conducted by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in July 2008 revealed if the election is conducted now, it will result with five national biggest political parties, consecutively PDIP (20,3%), Golkar (18,3%), PKS/Prosperous Justice Party (11,8), PKB (6,8%) and PD (5,2%). The awakening of PKS among top political parties below PDIP and Golkar has been consistently predicted since previous 2004 election.
In 2004 election PD and PKS became two rising stars amidst their different wakening backgrounds (Sapto Waluyo, 2005). If PD garnered votes among a pragmatic middle urban class with support of military-based family, PKS favored Islamic (santri) middle-urban class background. In general, it demonstrates that Indonesian voters are getting more deliberate and rationale in determining their political inclination. In other word, Indonesian democratic quality tends to increase.
Domestic Outlook
PKS phenomenon has drawn an attention of –especially- many domestic researchers. Indonesian expected that there were any radical changes in the beginning of reform era, but the protracted transition wasted the hope. Hence, an emergence of new and consistent political players is highly expected. The first research that broadly analyzed the appearance of PKS is of a young researcher, Ali Said Damanik. He wrote the social origin of the campus-based party.
The spread of any campus-based underground Islamist meeting that became a model in 1980s under New Order’s oppressive regime transformed into a formal Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus’s Islamic Proselytizing Institution). At critical time, the regime change, it again transformed into a student’s pressure group, namely KAMMI (United Action of Islamic Students), recalling a legendary student association, so called KAMI at the regime change of Sukarno has shown itself a brilliant political initiative. Its Islamist students and a nationwide campus-based network made its appearance became a significantly important at the time.
Interestingly, he not only chronicled the emergence of PKS as a consequence of a battle of thought in campus, tracked down its socially-rooted bases, namely ‘Gerakan Tarbiyah’ community (education movement) as well. It successfully developed a myriad Islamic-colored institutions from educational institution (Nurul Fikri Foundation, Ma’had al-Hikmah etc), publishing (Rabbani, Syaamil, I’tishom Press etc), magazines (Ummi, Saksi etc) till political think tank (SIDIK Foundation).
With its socially-based track, the PKS emergence is not actually extraordinary or natural in the eye of Indonesian Islamic movement history. Indonesian people already witnessed the birth of Muhammadiyah organization that stemmed from the process of small Islamic meeting (pengajian) around Masjid Kauman, Yogyakarta , 1912 (Mitsuo Nakamura, 1983 and James L. Peacock, 1978) as well as of Nahdlatul Ulama organization as a result of cultural movement and yellow-scripture (Kitab Kuning) based Islamic study in Pesantren (Islamic boarding) around Java Island in 1926. Based on logic of social change, the emergence of an Islamic political party is in normalcy if fostered by a modernist campus-based group.
The other author (Aay Muhammad Furkon, 2004) sought to track down PKS’ Hasan al Banna (the founder of Moslem Brotherhood, Egypt) inspired- ideological root and political practices. The political situation around 1980s was likely to enable a massive cross-border exchange of Islamic school of thought. The Islamic books from Middle East origin were boomingly translated intoIndonesia
The other author (Aay Muhammad Furkon, 2004) sought to track down PKS’ Hasan al Banna (the founder of Moslem Brotherhood, Egypt) inspired- ideological root and political practices. The political situation around 1980s was likely to enable a massive cross-border exchange of Islamic school of thought. The Islamic books from Middle East origin were boomingly translated into
In 1970s, the reform movement of Islamic thought was initiated by its founder, Nurkholis Madjid Along with the emergence of Islamic study group with its pioneer, Dawam Raharjo in Yogyakarta, a new stream of Islamic movement appeared in Bandung with its main mentor, namely Imadudin Abdurrahim, popularly called Bang Imad. Bang Imad designed and managed Latihan Mujahid Kampus (Campus Fighters Training) program that vigorously trained many Islamist activists from various campuses around Indonesia.
The stream of the Islamic movement heightened in 1980s with the increasing Islamic preachers not only insisted on Islam as an alternative ideology and system but criticized harshly against the Suharto regime. The figures like A.M Fatwa, Abdul Qadir Djaelani, and Tony Ardie were very popular among Islamic students and were invited to preach in various mosques, either in campuses or village’s mosques that sparked tension Islamist activists vis a vis regime that ultimately mounted many casualties –caused Tanjungpriok Tragedy in 1984 and –in turn- yielded a setback in the movement due to suppression. Many Islamic prominent figures were put in jail by Suharto’s security apparatus.
After a vacuum of oppression, Islamic proselytizing (dakwah) activities appeared again in 1990s but in more popular and fluid -not ideological- fashion. In the regard, Zainuddin M.Z –so called ‘a million audience-preacher’ became an iconic entertaining preacher. His step was followed by many Islamic preachers and eventually the model attracted level of celebrities and actresses that held the annual Ramadhan Safari or Preaching Parade from city to city. The Suharto’s political stance on Islamic activities finally got more moderate. He sponsored the formation of ICMI (Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Association) in December, 1990 and opened the celebration of Iedul Fitr Islamic Festival in National Monument accompanied by Zainuddin, Rhoma Irama, Emha Ainun Najid and several other Islamic prominent figures in February, 1997.
The initial Islamic proselytizing activities actually became an end of Suharto rule. At the critical situation, May 1989, all nine Islamic prominent figures that were trusted to form ‘Reform Committee’ in a way to save him from mounting public pressure denied the assignment. It pointed out that Islamic force may not be always able to be used to be legitimacy tool for authoritarian regime. At the end of the day, several critical Islamic force led by Amin Rais –at the time closely allied with KAMMI (embryonic PKS) that pushed the regime change could not be halted. In the context, we assume when Islamic activism has been culturally in mature or become socially-uprooted so its political emergence becomes inevitable.
The presence of PKS in contemporary Indonesian social dynamic can not be only politically measured but gives a new Islamic culture as well. We witness the appearance of very popular Islamic young preachers such as Abdullah Gymnastiar, Muhammad Arifin Ilham, Ary Ginanjar Agustian, and Jeffry al-Bukhori introduced new Islamic proselytizing approaches through programs such as soul management, zikir (remembering God) in congregation, emotional and spiritual quotient (ESQ) training, preaching in a dramaturgy or musically instrumented. These all pioneers can be carefully observed to have a close association with PKS’ activists or community. The PKS’ cadres even encouraged the birth of Islamic popular novelist generation that ultimately achieved a corpus of best-selling novel and top box-office movie, “Ayat-Ayat Cinta” (the Verses of Love). The success of new cultural wave is still underway since their corpuses are currently adapted into some mini series or wide-screens.
Thanks to its ideological flexibility and socio-cultural innovation, PKS appearance is not widely resisted from most Indonesian people, especially urban community. The new educated Moslem generation as a mix of product of reform era and globalization effect indeed required a new medium for their political aspiration. Despite some suspicions and allegations that PKS represents an anti-tradition movement or politicizing Islam but all allegations and suspicions can be revoked with any concrete actions of PKS’ community in all levels.
One of the fields that are yet researched seriously is the PKS influential role in forming a religious cultural mass, such as in music. PKS’ cadres reinvigorate Nasyid (Islamic acapella). In 1980s, nasyid among Islamic activists were directly adopted from Arabic Middle East. Their lyrics were about the struggle ofPalestine
In opinion of Yon Mahmudi (2005), PKS has built a new variant of convergent Islamic group (santri) when an Islamic reform movement meets a socio-political change in information era. Through its gradual Islamic educational process, PKS successfully balances between the required Islamic purification and local tradition in which these efforts are often failed to be accommodated smoothly by Islamist modernists. PKS has developed as well the moderate and inclusive Islamic outlook without trapped in debate between Islamic formalists and substantialist. In his PhD thesis, Yon Machmudi argued that PKS political agenda can not be deemed a threat for plural Indonesian people. Otherwise, PKS practically brings about a new spirit for a concrete social action for Indonesian people indiscriminately.
After a vacuum of oppression, Islamic proselytizing (dakwah) activities appeared again in 1990s but in more popular and fluid -not ideological- fashion. In the regard, Zainuddin M.Z –so called ‘a million audience-preacher’ became an iconic entertaining preacher. His step was followed by many Islamic preachers and eventually the model attracted level of celebrities and actresses that held the annual Ramadhan Safari or Preaching Parade from city to city. The Suharto’s political stance on Islamic activities finally got more moderate. He sponsored the formation of ICMI (Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Association) in December, 1990 and opened the celebration of Iedul Fitr Islamic Festival in National Monument accompanied by Zainuddin, Rhoma Irama, Emha Ainun Najid and several other Islamic prominent figures in February, 1997.
The initial Islamic proselytizing activities actually became an end of Suharto rule. At the critical situation, May 1989, all nine Islamic prominent figures that were trusted to form ‘Reform Committee’ in a way to save him from mounting public pressure denied the assignment. It pointed out that Islamic force may not be always able to be used to be legitimacy tool for authoritarian regime. At the end of the day, several critical Islamic force led by Amin Rais –at the time closely allied with KAMMI (embryonic PKS) that pushed the regime change could not be halted. In the context, we assume when Islamic activism has been culturally in mature or become socially-uprooted so its political emergence becomes inevitable.
The presence of PKS in contemporary Indonesian social dynamic can not be only politically measured but gives a new Islamic culture as well. We witness the appearance of very popular Islamic young preachers such as Abdullah Gymnastiar, Muhammad Arifin Ilham, Ary Ginanjar Agustian, and Jeffry al-Bukhori introduced new Islamic proselytizing approaches through programs such as soul management, zikir (remembering God) in congregation, emotional and spiritual quotient (ESQ) training, preaching in a dramaturgy or musically instrumented. These all pioneers can be carefully observed to have a close association with PKS’ activists or community. The PKS’ cadres even encouraged the birth of Islamic popular novelist generation that ultimately achieved a corpus of best-selling novel and top box-office movie, “Ayat-Ayat Cinta” (the Verses of Love). The success of new cultural wave is still underway since their corpuses are currently adapted into some mini series or wide-screens.
Thanks to its ideological flexibility and socio-cultural innovation, PKS appearance is not widely resisted from most Indonesian people, especially urban community. The new educated Moslem generation as a mix of product of reform era and globalization effect indeed required a new medium for their political aspiration. Despite some suspicions and allegations that PKS represents an anti-tradition movement or politicizing Islam but all allegations and suspicions can be revoked with any concrete actions of PKS’ community in all levels.
One of the fields that are yet researched seriously is the PKS influential role in forming a religious cultural mass, such as in music. PKS’ cadres reinvigorate Nasyid (Islamic acapella). In 1980s, nasyid among Islamic activists were directly adopted from Arabic Middle East. Their lyrics were about the struggle of
In opinion of Yon Mahmudi (2005), PKS has built a new variant of convergent Islamic group (santri) when an Islamic reform movement meets a socio-political change in information era. Through its gradual Islamic educational process, PKS successfully balances between the required Islamic purification and local tradition in which these efforts are often failed to be accommodated smoothly by Islamist modernists. PKS has developed as well the moderate and inclusive Islamic outlook without trapped in debate between Islamic formalists and substantialist. In his PhD thesis, Yon Machmudi argued that PKS political agenda can not be deemed a threat for plural Indonesian people. Otherwise, PKS practically brings about a new spirit for a concrete social action for Indonesian people indiscriminately.
Some observers perhaps have a suspicion that PKS has a hidden political agenda, i.e. imposing Islamic Syari’ah. However, Nandang Baharuddin (2004) explained that PKS had a distinct perspective of implementing Syari’ah. Syariah can not be merely understood as a legal product but consists of improvement of individual morality, family capacity building, and collective behavioral change. Hence, PKS’ mission to campaign a clean (freedom of corruption) and caring (of people agony) movement was conceptualized as a part of Syariah values. With its current slogan,’ Clean, Caring and Professional’, PKS not only developed personal and social piety but technical competence as well. The last factor is seldom noticed and developed among Islamic parties which generate the thesis developed by Oliver Roy about the failure of political Islam when in power.
Foreign Outlook
If domestic observers analyzed in curiosity how Campuses’ small Islamic groups may play a significant role in contemporary politics in Indonesia after reform, otherwise mostly foreign observers look up the link between PKS and the other global Islamic movements. Unfortunately, there is no serious research to seriously map out the new political player within contemporary Indonesian politics about the issue, except the various comments from international media so the observers still defined the feature of contemporary Indonesian Islam based on old and simple division of a mix of two mainstreams between Islamic modernists of Muhammadiyyah and traditionalist of Nahdlatul Ulama. Moreover, a new Moslem generation has cultivated a cross-border experience and knowledge so it is difficult to include the generation in a previously clear social category. The PKS’ presence is relatively new and likely to be considered unimportant due to mostly ill-experienced young generation. PKS is also negatively viewed not having a wide social basis and a saliently track political record. On the onset, the misperception begins.
The most extreme outlook was conveyed by Zachary Abuza that put PKS as one of variant Islamic political groups with the mission of imposing Islamic Syari’ah in pluralistic-democratic Indonesia. Impliedly, Abuza contended that PKS had a likelihood of greater mission, i.e. hidden agenda to form an Islamic state in Indonesia and reinvigorate the creation of regional Islamic caliphate in South East Asia . Based on the allegation, PKS was intentionally put in a similar box with other Islamic movements such as Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia
A similar outlook was opined by Sadanand Dhume, ex journalist once assigned in Indonesia and wrote a book entitled,” My Friend the Fanatic: Travel with Indonesian Islamist” based on his travel around many cities and meeting with some Indonesian Islamic organization activist. He gave a red notice that democratization process in Indonesia Algeria
Some issue must be addressed, especially about the issue of imposing Islamic Syariah as PKS’ hidden agenda. As explained before, PKS views Syariah is not merely a legal construct-limitedly a criminal law but is viewed in wide perspectives that encompass the management of whole aspects of life, starting from individual, family to society. In a contemporary Indonesian politics, PKS bluntly defined that eradication of corruption and graft and the increase of Indonesian wealth and prosperity are a part of Syari’ah implementation.
In its official document released in 2008, PKS reasserts its main goal,” to implement a prosperous and just civil society (masyarakat madani) that was blessed by the God in the shade of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)”. A civil society is then formulated as an advanced and high civilized society based on values, norms and moral underpinning of faith, respect of plurality, inclusiveness, democracy and cooperation to defend the state sovereignty. In that sense, PKS blends the genuine definition of civil society in the context of three fraternity bonds, i.e. Islamic fraternity (ukhuwwah Islamiyyah), national fraternity (ukhuwwah wathoniyyah) and human fraternity (ukhuwwah basyariyyah).
Ideologically, there is no fundamental difference between PKS and mainstream Islamic movements. There is no aspiration for formation of Islamic theocratic state or middle-aged world government. PKS does appreciate any universal Islamic values in contemporary Indonesian context through method of objectification of all sectors of life.
An objective observation was offered by Greg Fealy (in Mahmudi, 2005). He contended the requirement of new framework, since PKS applied Islamic a political approach that never existed in Indonesian history. Fealy analyzed four PKS’ advantages: Firstly, PKS adopted foreign inspired ideological source. Secondly, the only genuine cadres based political party. Thirdly, the party owned an effective wide social network. Fourthly, raising the morality in political life is as its main program. The characteristic successfully garnered public support from 1.4 percent of popular voters in 1999 election to 7.3 percent in 2004 election and expected to increase up to 10 percent in 2009 election.
Elizabeth Collin saw a similar indication (2004) that leadership of PKS successfully attained a positive image as a moral reform-based and moderate Islamic political party while keep involving in a pragmatic politics. Not many Islamic political entities successfully remained consistent in meeting moral challenge and political pragmatism so the future of the party will be still tested. But Collin concluded that PKS has no way to expand its basis of support from labors and rural-based farmers so its greater role of political change is still unsurely predicted. Both positive and negative outlooks will become a historical test case of PKS. The current challenge confronting PKS right now, whether PKS will successfully go beyond historical threshold of 20 percent as previously cultivated by Masyumi in 1955 election?
Expanding Its Social Bases
The answer of the challenging question very much relies on political practices of PKS in transforming its vision and mission as well managing its potential core cadres and constituents. As an initial study case, it can be referring to the PKS victory in West Java and North Sumatera province. In West Java , PKS allied with PAN (National Mandate Party) successfully lapsed the long time dominance of Golkar and PDIP in the province. Meanwhile, under coalition with PPP (Development and Unity Party) and PBB (Crescent and Star Party) in North Sumatera , PKS crippled Golkar and PDIP in their traditional bases as well. Those two spectacular victories reflected the PKS ability to garner Islamic modernist voters.
Meanwhile in NTB Province, it achieved the remarkable victory with coalition with PBB supported by a biggest Islamic traditionalists’ organization, so called Nahdlatul Wathan in surrounding Lombok Island. The political experiments conducted by PKS are not certainly the only standard but PKS, at least, has demonstrated its wider acceptability in both modernists-urban and traditionalist-rural community. If these political experiences are reflected and formulated into an appropriate strategy, the obstacles of PKS to attract a rural-traditionalist segment in East and Central Java so far can be addressed.
The next question that is likely to appear as a consequence of its expanding social bases is how PKS maintain its plurality among membership and constituents. A simple question but is not easily addressed because PKS is generally overviewed among observers as a very homogeneous political party characterized in a centralistic leadership. In the regard, many facts are not publicly known so far. The founding board of PK (the former PKS) actually consisted of very different-background figures from traditionalists to modernists spectrum. The traditionalists are represented by figures such as DR. Daud Rasyid Sitorus and DR. Salim Segaf al-Jufry (the grandson of founder of al Washliyah), the late Rahmad Abdullah (Asy Safiiyyah), Ahmad Heriawan (the head of PUI organization), and Acep Abdus Syukur (Mathlaul Anwar). The modernists are represented by Mutammimul Ula (PII), Abdi Sumaithi (DDII), Sumanjaya Rukmandis (HMI), Makmur Hasanuddin (Persis), Yusuf Supendi (BKSPPSI). One of its 50 founders is even a Chinese ethnic Indonesian, namely Chin Kun Min from West Sumatera . The facts that are almost publicly unknown but it is likely to draw the likelihood of expanding its bases since its first formation of the party (PK). While the founding board of PKS is getting broader than its predecessor, PK. It formally formed the highest decision making institution, namely Majelis Syuro (consultative assembly) that at least held a meeting a year. It was chaired by some 99 elected-representatives from all Indonesian provinces in addition to some appointed members from both religious and professional competence-based appointees. The decision was made by the body based on an absolute agreement or voting. The body is not dominated by a certain figure or Middle East alumni as publicly – but mistakenly- perceived. Meanwhile, some domestically graduated Islamic scholars or Middle East alumni formed the body, namely Board of Syariah.
With its inclusive format, PKS may enable to recruit some wider and more different background constituents. In the regard, PKS community can be deemed a melting pot for various organizational activists and community groups that were not canalized by any formal institution. With its previously described-collective characteristics, PKS can not be defined as a genuine modernist political party, but more likely to be a representative of a transitional community when a line between traditionalism and modernism are getting blurred.
The inclusiveness of PKS is clearly indicated when PKS sets up a coalition with other Islamic parties or nationalist parties. PKS even in Moslem minority such as Papua was happily allied with Christian party, PDS (Prosperous and Peace Party) in its gubernatorial election. PKS also had some non-Muslim members of legislatives in the province. It should break the unfairly created myth as well as the black campaign that PKS is exclusively fundamentalist and not genuine Islamic party. That is why I propose that we intentionally erase the misleading dichotomy between Islamic political parties versus nationalist political parties. In Indonesian context fortunately appears the new terminology of nationalist religious party or religious-nationalist party.
The misunderstanding about Islamic political party must be cleared as referring to misassumption of AKP (the Justice and Development Party) in Turkey as militant-Islamist party while it clearly put and support secularism as its ideology. If AKP transformed the old secularism into a new one in Turkey
Changing Perception
With a new social base and more inclusive political outlook, the awakening of Islamic political party is not impossible in national political stage in the future. The Head of PKS’ Majelis Syuro, Hilmi Aminuddin (2008) brought about the five recipes of political advantages of PKS’ Islamic proselytizing activities as follows: 1) winning values, 2) winning concept, 3) winning system, 4) winning team, and last 5) winning goals. The winning value is more reflected in service, change, concern of nation salvation from the crisis than merely pursuance of power. The winning concept can be seen from its philosophy and policies that encompass all aspects of development community and state. The winning system is initiated by the formation of a solid organization from up to bottom level and the winning goal is the promotion of civil society that protects all encompassing people indiscriminately.
As the PKS phenomena are very little observed by observers, the Hilmi Aminuddin outlook as founding father of PKS is seldom reviewed as well. In his contemporary thought, he –a Sundanese-ethnic Islamic Scholar, explained trauma perception that must be necessarily avoided by the cadres. Every cadre strongly avoids a sense of: a) becoming a loser in battle, b) being an object of external pressure, c) assuming conspiracy mentality, d) inferiority complex, e) negative thinking, and f) imitation. Hilmi is a very rare Islamic scholar that masters any classical Islamic references but successfully articulated his Islamic ideas into an understandable language among his secularly-educated background young audiences. Even, his delicate knowledge of modern management often colored his political direction among cadres. The unique figure became strength of its ideological factor as well as its flexibility in interacting with and participating in a plural society.
With its socio-political capacity, PKS may be potentially a problem solver in the future, not a threat for national unity. Its unique position will make PKS as a new Islamic emerging force.
*Executive Director of CIR
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