There are many diverse definitions about limited war and for purposes of analysis, we would examine 2 such definitions. Firstly, Robert E Osgood defines ‘limited war’ as a war fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state’s will to another’s, and by means involving far less than the total military resources of the belligerents, leaving the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents, intact and leading to a bargained termination. Henry Kissinger defines it as “war confined to a defined geographic area, or war that does not utilize the entire available weapons system (such as refraining from the use of thermonuclear weapons). It may be a war which utilizes the entire weapons system but it limits its employment to specific targets.”
Based on Osgood’s definition, Limited War could primarily be categorized as comprising attributes of war fought for ‘limited ends with limited means’. This is rather generalized and as such we would also include ‘leaving civilian life and armed forces intact’ and Kissinger’s point on Limited War fought within ‘confines of a defined geographical area’. It is within the boundaries of these attributes juxtapose with the Korean War – 1950-1953, that the report aims to examine whether the Korean War could be categorized as Limited War.
LIMITED WAR STRATEGIES
Western strategists developed Limited War in reaction to the inclination of states to wage a total war - as occurred in two world wars - and the fears of devastation of nuclear exchange. It has shaped the American approach to use of force; and aided in formulation of doctrine and US USSR , China
During Kennedy’s period, there were 3 kinds of Limited War strategies: local or theatre war between states; unconventional or internal war; and strategic or central war that involves US and USSR’s use of strategic nuclear capacity. Specifically, each war strategy is latched to three functions of military strategy: deterrence (the prevention of military attack and war); denial (the defeat of a military attack); and political support (the support of national policy ranging from crises and diplomacy containment).
THE ‘LIMITS’ OF KOREAN WAR (1950-1953)
On 25 Jun 1950, North Korea launched an invasion on South Korea and a few days after, the US and United Nations launched a counter offensive with aim to restore security to South Korea and chase North Koreans north of the 38th parallel. Truman called this Limited War a ‘police-action’ instead of a war as he would be absolved from seeking concurrence from congress.
At the US political front, they had to grapple with global strategic priority to contain Soviet advance in Europe. As a result and among other reasons, the Truman administration sent an emphatic message to communist powers that it was not interested in escalating the conflict. Militarily, the Truman administration enforced restrictions on use of force from ground, sea and air. These clearly fit into the categories of limited political ends and means.
Limits on Ground War
Despite MacArthur’s successful amphibious assault in October 1950 at Inchon to cut off North Korean lines of communication and subsequently forced the latter to retreat, MacArthur’s repeated calls for extra divisions for further push beyond the 38th parallel was rejected by Truman on 2 grounds. First, the US forces’ commitment to other troubled spots was already overstretched. Truman also feared that the northern push might precipitate military action from the People’s Republic of China - Chiang Kai-Shek offered to use his troop in Korea but JJC believed that the offer would just cause Beijing to commit even larger, estimated 4.5 million troops to enter into the Korean conflict that engendered total war. However, the push beyond 38th parallel proceeded – a change in original limited aim - and on 26 November 1950, “volunteers” from China China not at war with US and allies and could be viewed as China Panmunjom in July 1951 - with deployment of UNC along borders.
Limits on Sea War
US and coalition navy were restricted from conducting naval operations beyond the Korean combat zone. In addition, ground support was primarily provided by Seventh fleet and the Allied sea units through carrier-based air raids and transportation of troops and war logistics.
USSR despite having the capability to loan, lease, or direct dispatch of her vessels to Korean waters through its sizeable Far East Fleet stationed in Vladivostok, decided to keep forces at bay and refrained from escalating any tensions.
Both forces demonstrated attributes of Limited War. On a separate note, Limited War invariably has its toll on political-military relations. Truman had to deny another of MacArthur’s bold proposals: naval blockage of Communist China and shelling of targets along China
Limits on Air War
The air restrictions were well described in the discontent of Lieutenant General Earle Partridge, Head of The Fifth Air Force, “FEAF handicapped in the shooting war by not permitted to cross the 38th parallel to destroy enemy at its source of staging.” This restriction was lifted shortly but numerous other handicaps were drawn - no aerial campaigns over mainland China; no hot Pursuit across the Yalu River over Manchuria; and limits on bombing targets along Yalu River.
The restrictions imposed on ground, sea, and air demonstrated the strict adherence of confining war within the Korean Peninsular itself, avoiding spillage to neighbouring states - matching Limited War categorisation.
Even though the casualties figures were high (close to 4 million), it is still far short when compared to that during Total War experienced in WWI and WW II - of close to 37 million and 62 million casualties respectively - and hence, short of any known and acceptable quantitative comparison, is still considered limited.
CONCLUSION
Theory of Limited War enables us to understand the complex inter and intra-play between politics and military, in preventing escalation into a total war. The Korean War, based on the attributes of fighting for limited ends with limited means within the confines of geographical location - albeit constant difficulties in keeping absolute civilian and armed forces in tact despite non-excessive use of force - is largely categorized as a Limited War.
Contributed by:
Ahmad Dzakirin Zhou Suli
Akzam Shukri Haji Adnan Lim Cheng Chuan Johnny
John Campbell Koh Ke Yuen
Jolene Anne R. Jerard Soh Fong Jin
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