Blog Ahmad Dzakirin

The collapse of Soviet bloc affected the erosion of long standing strategic rationale behind the major US military deployment in East Asia. In addition to the US economic difficulties that was reflected in its domestic economic constraints on military expenditure and the Philippines refusal to extend the leases of the US’s military bases in Philippines. Philippines demanded a complete US military withdrawal by November 1992. It irrevocably created a “window of opportunity” for major powers such as China, Japan and India to be more assertive and independent after the US withdrawal.  

Meanwhile, rising China both militarily and economically has been most concern and alarmed the security situation among its neighbor countries due some uncertain factors of geographical proximity. Some ASEAN members still have some contentious problems regarding the territorial disputes such as against China over Spratlay islands that led to military conflict and escalation (Vietnam and Philippines). The concern partly stems from the Confusion-reflected hierarchical Sino civilization that possibly attracted the advent of other form of Sino’s past imperialism. In particular, South East Asia has historical experience with Chinese hegemony. Anyway, Post Cold War; the existing pattern of international alignment for decades has significantly changed. ASEAN feared that Southeast Asia could become another strategic buffer zone, pulled out in one direction or other by big powers.

Due to uncertain circumstances, the middle powers such as ASEAN are likely to redefine their interests. ASEAN tried to establish a steering role in East Asian community building with “ASEAN way”. The emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 1994 was designed to be both a symptom of and a response to changes of security context in a predictably new rising power in East Asia as well as the regional security implication post Cold War. The formation of ARF is deemed to be a cultural adjustment of middle powers in the security context to engage the major powers, for example China in a fruitful arrangement as well as an extension of security arrangement but in limited way. It is very crucial because ASEAN was not at all intended or articulated on basis of security defense.

The paper is intended to see the diplomacy efforts of ASEAN to handle the security implications due to rising power, China through typically middle powers concerted efforts, i.e., maintenance of balance of power but in soft balancing and non-risk hedging in one hand and in other hand promoting non-coercive, multilateral standing and to assess the future and its implication to mitigate the rising power. 

The Strategy of Middle Powers: the Theoretical Framework 

There are many definitions of ‘middle powers’ Hill –for example in more comprehensive one- defined middle powers, “the medium power regards itself as of sufficient weight and substance to be in charge of its own destiny; and it realizes that its uniqueness is complicated enough, and different enough, even from its closest friends, to ensure that, in some crises at any rate coincidence of interest will not be enough to engage help on their side. Thus, the medium power will try to create and keep under national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions whose outcome will be the preservation of its vital interests.”  Based on the definition, the characteristics of middle powers fall into some categories: first, lesser and weaker military capability, second, but much autonomous and independent in strategic policy to preserve their interests, third, to seek balance of power and their national defense deterrence.

In realist perspective, the middle powers characterized diplomacy in their limited resources is to seek and preserve equilibrium among the great powers. Middle power viewed that the dominance of any certain great power in the region will impede their freedom of maneuver and conceivably posed a threat to regional order. To regard the possible threats, middle power sought to engage some checks and balances. In their assessment, middle powers recognize that great powers are capable of contributing positively or negatively to the equilibrium or balance of the region, hence their defense policy will be engaged in –in one hand- being aligned with the weaker states and –other hand- embrace the greater states in other region to provide security umbrella to deter external threat of other great power. But, in Southeast Asian countries case, the strategy on contrast with many middle powers strategy of defense alliances- is differently pursued by ASEAN by encouraging participation among major powers in dialogue process. The ASEAN countries have developed a sense of regional association that has reflected a political desire not to be aligned with any major powers and professed their neutrality.

ASEAN has successfully established for itself a pivotal role in East Asian community building by inviting major powers to negotiate in informal multilateral dialogue, ARF. It is designed to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Thank to competition among major powers, ASEAN seized the opportunity to draw 25 members into a bidding competition for the hearts and minds of ASEAN. ASEAN has become central stage of regional institution building in East Asia. 

The Tension of Sino-ASEAN Relation 

The rising China politically and economically as aforementioned before alarmed the neighbor countries. The grave concerns stemmed from first, the distorted composition of China’s aggregate demand, in which consumption represents only 40 percent as well as investment account, while the total export and import approximately reach 60 percent of GDP. The Chinese economic sustainability under the authoritarian one party system leads to uncertainty in region meanwhile many neighbor states tend to democratizing. Furthermore, in sense of security, overwhelming Chinese military modernization significantly raised aggravating concerns of East Asian countries, including ASEAN. The volatile situation of rising China is not merely indicated by its political challenge –the likelihood of the assertiveness of creeping jurisdiction strategy but also the likelihood of historical Sinocentric interstate system that much more characterized ‘a tributary expansionist relationship.

ASEAN countries have passed through the difficult relation with China although recently undergone significant changes over the past 15 years. After the failed communists’ coup in 1965 that was alleged to be backed by Beijing and due to red threat, Indonesia severed its diplomatic relation with China after its warmest and closest relation for decades but restored in 1990. The step was subsequently followed by Singapore. Although, Malaysia established diplomatic relation with China in 1974 but Kuala Lumpur harbored the allegation about Beijing support over Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM). Even Mahathir during early years of his administration warned against Beijing’s dangerous ambition in the region. With Vietnam, the relation began deteriorated after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. China perceived Vietnam’s assertiveness of part of the Soviet strategy to encircle China and dragged China in war with Vietnam in 1978 and 1988. 

In the recent development in 1990, the proven reserves of rich marine natural resources claims over some atolls and islands in the South China Sea led to China asserting its sovereignty on the basis of sovereign sea territorial sense and pragmatic economic consideration. China excessively claimed that 3 millions square km of its traditional territorial waters have been illegally annexed and delineated into territorial domain of other nations such as Philippines (410,000), Malaysia (270,000), Vietnam (70,000), Indonesia (50,000) and the rest Brunei. To ensure its claim, China unilaterally sent its military might in the disputed territories and expanded its influences by developing its blue water navy capabilities. China’s construction of shelters in Mischief Reef was considered to be an act of aggressiveness that threatened the regional security order. Furthermore, in February 1992, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) issued the Law of Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone that claims complete sovereignty over the entire Spratly Islands groups that are partly or in whole also claimed by different states such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam as well as over Paracel that is challenged by Taiwan and Vietnam.

Since 1995, after several contentious incidents with neighbor countries and implication of and Western and the US embargo post Tiananmen incident in 1989. China made any significant changes in its foreign policy with Southeast Asian countries and evolved in more cooperative and multilateral initiative to minimize the disputes. 

Engaging China: ASEAN A Concerted Diplomacy through ARF 

Undeniably, the fear of China’ creeping assertiveness and some issues raised ASEAN’s unified and firmer action. For the first time, In March 1995, ASEAN made a common position on South China Sea and called for all conflicting parties to adhere to the spirit of the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea that reflected the ASEAN principle of non-violent settlement of disputes, norm-building and confidence-building measure and was subsequently put on the agenda of the ARF amidst China objection. ASEAN adopted a unified front against China. It is interesting because ASEAN on behalf Southeast Asian Countries engaged unequally a state, a rising and powerful China. A decade later in 4 November 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Although, the treaty was not able to guarantee China to be committed a code of conduct but at least was expected to oblige China to pursue multilateral approach to the issue, a great shift from its previous preferable bilateral effort.

This actions were likely to be smartly adopted: first, internally to develop consensus and unified action among members to confront some contentious issues and the likelihood of violent conflicts in the region since some members had similar claims over the disputed territory as well as the unbalance military capabilities to challenge the rising China, second,China externally to send a strong message that the peaceful code of conduct must be accepted by Beijing and would effectively constraint China to refrain from the use of power. eventually seemed to realize the strong message. After 7 years of eviction of the US naval and air force in Clarke and Subic, Philippines invited the presence of the US military by signing the Treaty of Visiting Force Agreement in February 1998, in addition to the existing limited US naval base in Singapore after the closure. 

Post initial Cold War, ASEAN seemed to redefine their security interests and assess the changing regional environment at highest assertiveness of Chinese foreign and security policy. One of ASEAN’s main security interests is to hedge against an ever growing China. Therefore, ASEAN sought to preserve equilibrium and balance of power among the great powers as noted by Acharya,” The ASEAN states’ preferred approach to regional order seems to lie in the maintenance of a regional balance of power, underpinned by the superior and forward-deployed military resources of the US and capable of deterring Chinese and Japanese regional ambitions.” Although such opinion undeniably emerged due to some actual alliances by some ASEAN members with the US but it could not describe the credible explanation in terms of the trends and outcomes of favorable multilateral characteristic in both Sino-ASEAN relation and the ASEAN and other great powers relation, instead of coercion, arms races and alliances in the region.

Otherwise, the existence of ARF was deemed to be a wider and extended framework to cope with the security issue beyond its limited regional scope that successfully invited the major powers to hold a routine informal multilateral meeting. The formation of ARF itself emerged as consequences of the January 1992 Summit Meeting in Singapore after the collapse of Soviet Union, the US withdrawal from Philippines bases in 1991 and the likely impact on former Indonesian President, Suharto visit to China after reestablishing its diplomatic relation. Indonesia was as a very influential member- very apprehensive about the prospect of development that sustained the regional assertiveness and therefore, the Summit needed to recognize the necessity to look beyond Southeast Asia to cope with the new regional security context and made the security priority at its highest agenda.

ASEAN through ARF has moved forward to engage the great powers in more benign approaches and interestingly resulted in reducing an inevitably destabilizing by products of power balance such as military alliances and arms races among the major powers. ARF became a pivotal regional institution in management of regional order post Cold War. ASEAN realized their lesser military capabilities to engage China would be costly and futile but also did concern the possible threat of Chinese creeping jurisdiction deep into the heart of Southeast Asia. So the Summit decision in Singapore had its relevance.

ASEAN has shifted from the traditional definition of balance of power, such as military alliance and arms race, but to provide fruitful dialogue forum for major powers to negotiate their interests as well as bolster fruitful cooperation for ASEAN itself and enhance more preferable multilateral approaches among the great powers to solve the problems either with ASEAN or among them in regional context. Although, ASEAN benefited from the limited presence of the US military deployment after the closure of overseas military bases in Southeast Asia, but it was never intended to be a real military alliance to deter China and much more reflected the bilateral initiatives. Indonesia and Malaysia preferably sought to cope with some regional contentious issues in much ARF frameworks, rather than ‘power projection’ and insisted on the denial of external intervention and interference policy. In terms of regional security issues, ASEAN countries preferably leveraged their position as a group. It contrasted with other middle powers in other regions which are to prefer leaning on other one side policy to seek security umbrella amidst the possible threat of rising major power.

The significant change in its foreign policy Post Cold War is much more influenced by the aforementioned ever changing international and regional environment. China was going for soft power.  The demise of communist bloc in certain degree –weakened the relevance of “ideological Chinese playing card” besides China sought regional political support and partner after Western and the US embargo due to alleged pro-democracy activists’ massacre in Tiananmen. China worried the impact of the incident would contain and encircle its regional position in East Asia into periphery, in addition to the support over Taiwan issue. Therefore, China launched ‘a good neighborly policy’ with key ASEAN member states. Hence, its strategy more focused on Asia policy and thus resulted with greater attention to Southeast Asia. The Chinese Confucius teaching culturally contributed the shift of much more soft power policy in its international diplomacy.

Practically, The Chinese good neighborly policy was gradually indicated by the total halt of ideological support of communist insurgence movements in the regions as well as the issue of laws on Chinese citizenship that required Chinese overseas to adopt the citizenship of their countries’ residence in 1989 or precisely before the some incidents regarding disputed territories with some ASEAN countries. Those two policies were considered to be a critical step in courting a better relationship with its southern neighbor countries and definitely paved the way for improvement of political ties. Since then, Indonesia restored its diplomatic relation with China and subsequently followed by Singapore.

But after the incidents (excessive claim of sea jurisdiction in its law and Spratly incidents), China more embraced with soft power approaches. China was invited to attend the opening of 24^th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and consecutively since then. In 1994, China became a consultative dialogue partner of ASEAN. The status was elevated in 1996 a full dialogue partner. In 1997, Chinese President, Jiang Zemin in the first ever Summit in Malaysia issued a joint statement of establishing a partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust between China and ASEAN toward the 21^st Century. In October 2003, China and ASEAN once again made another crucial step to enhance the better relationship by signing “Joint Declaration of the PRC and ASEAN State Leaders- a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.

The change of Chinese political attitude over its neighbor countries –at least officially made significant progress of Southeast Asian countries image such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia itself asserted that China is no longer threat and the US military projection in Southeast Asia was waste of money.  Anyway, ASEAN still regarded China in terms of real politics; China is still part of Southeast Asia due to geographical proximity as well as the awareness of the necessity of pragmatic approach to engage China.  Therefore, the existence of ARF in that perspective is considered to be “low-cost engagement- against major powers, i.e. China which ASEAN is likely to extend in the future.

The ARF has been an effective vehicle to develop the multilateral arrangement. Out of Japan, China indicated to be a participant of attraction that extends their more active participation in terms of contest of influence among major powers within the informal dialogue and consultation. Although, ASEAN members have no quite similar definition on their regional security interests and arrangements that admittedly hinder the likelihood of  further cooperative security – Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines see the necessity of the limited US military deployment as counter-balance of the “window of opportunity” for the assertiveness of major power meanwhile Indonesia and Malaysia are much more reluctant on the issue, but the pragmatic approach, the economic benefit from rising China but on the hand,  the impact of “creeping” assertiveness already became a “political glue” for ASEAN –as middle powers- in defining their more benign and fruitful response against China through ARF. But interestingly, although the “loose” consultation forum covers some security cooperation such as the security management on the Straits of Malacca, the cooperation on the anti-terrorism campaign but ARF never moved to be a security community or even defense pact.

In his study on ASEAN, Soesastro shows the uniqueness of this regional institution in term of its concerted political and security arrangement as well as economic arrangement against the major powers that is different with the approaches of old regional institutions. (See figure 2). In the case of ASEAN’s political and security arrangement, this regional institution already adopted the principle of inclusiveness, namely the inclusion of the very sources of uncertainties in their regional arrangement concerned. In the perspective, ARF has been the right institution at the right time. It successfully alleviates some of uncertainties resulting from the changing environment in the Asia-Pacific region Post Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of new regional powers such as China and Japan that significantly shift the balance of power. The formation of ARF significantly mitigates any uncertainties from such changing by bringing down those parties (China and Japan) together with the US in one fruitful dialogues forum.

The Implication the ASEAN-Sino Relation on the US 

ARF has been more realistic option in engaging China and –to some extent- other major powers including the US rather than fruitlessly contain China. ARF has been the forum of attraction for China to ensure its friendly regional policy over ASEAN through mutual cooperation and eventually win “hearts and minds” of ASEAN. Otherwise, the US ignorantly adheres to ARF arrangement.  The US still sees the ARF arrangement in peripheral projection in terms of economy.  Its strategy in Southeast Asia still strictly focused on security cooperation.

Within the US absence in ASEAN Summit in October 2003, China signed a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and previously a series of “breathtaking” formal agreements in broader perspectives, ranging from economy to security issues. Washington failed to predict the enhancement of Sino-ASEAN closer relation that predictably affected the likelihood of ‘neutrality’ regarding China’s interests in the region and in any future conflict between China and the US. It is understandable that the US “War on Terror “Campaign significantly distracted the US’s “more forward policy” rather than on –a typical hegemon- the US-one sided security interests over ASEAN. In addition to China’s non interference and intervention foreign policy became another attraction to middle powers and developing countries.

In terms of the US security engagement. In response to the US proposal on a CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) -like regional security engagement in 1993 and the like, RMSI (regional Maritime Security Initiative) in 2004, ASEAN, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia. Since the very beginning, ASEAN as a regional institution was inclined to not having military alliance. The former Malaysia Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir said in the Summit ,”We, even in the ASEAN grouping, refuse to have any alliance except for some trade arrangements. We are not committed to any form of security agreement.” This issue was reasserted by his successor, Badawi as well their reluctance regarding any the US new security arrangement proposals. 

To sum up, in the contest of influence in Southeast Asia, Washington has lost out to China. “Over past decade, Beijing has demonstrated a diplomatic savvy as expressed by a range of declarations and agreements reached with ASEAN, such as ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, The Declaration on the South China Sea, Chinese accession to the ASEAN treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the like. This contrast starkly with the ambiguous state of the US- Southeast Asian ties over the same period,” and at worse, amidst the increase of anti US in Southeast Asia. 

Peaceful China Rise in Future? 

The peaceful engagement has been shown skillfully by the Chinese administration as reflected with its ASEAN neighbor. The measure undeniably has upgraded the building capacity of trust and relation between Sino-ASEAN. ARF definitely played a pivotal role in socializing and integrating China into the multilateral and much more pragmatic engagement that benefited both sides. The question still lies whether the China still keep in peaceful tract. In the short and middle term, China still trustfully indicated the peaceful rise of great power. In the greater of oil and gas exhaustion, -to  be a second largest consumer and third largest importer-  China peacefully avoided the likelihood of conflict with its neighbor states by expanding its oil policy with irrelatively vulnerable spots, either in disputed territory in south China Sea or volatile region like Middle East.

The rising China economically refrained from Chinese military or violent measures, and effectively China-in liberal perspective- became more integrated into international and regional system. China already became a responsible stakeholder in the international system. “China is big, it is growing, and it will influence the world in the years ahead.” Otherwise, as noted by Ian Johnston data since 1949 up to 1992, China is more dispute-prone rather than most major power except US. The remarkable military modernization, the future volatile conflict over the Taiwan Straits and a typical authoritarian state still became concern of the future China for ASEAN. Otherwise, Has China had a dualistic strategic culture, idealistic pacifist as well as real-politics bellicose. China projected some missiles ahead to Taiwan in terms of Taiwan-China conflict and blue water military doctrine, it reflected a question whether China still sought the broader peaceful measure of many unresolved issues with its neighbor countries as well.

Because in the bottom of line, the unresolved disputes still became unresolved and hanging over. China still kept stance on its all-encompassing claim of Spratly Islands and potentially conflicting with all ASEAN members except Singapore and just partly accepted the multilateral channel and non-violent measure in resolving conflict, so the problem is definitely still there and the fear of energy scarcity and depletion will be volatile and loophole of conflict in the future.