*Ahmad Dzakirin
In 1941, The Japan Air Force hit the US Naval Fleet Base in Pearl Harbor. Many historians believed that one of its Japan original decisions was driven by the unavoidable response of the US embargo to limit the Japan’s oil demand that totally relied on oil import and 80 percent of it supplied by the US. Japan itself needed the greater access of natural resources –especially oil- to sustain its rapid modernization and growth after Meiji Restoration that then mostly controlled by military. In Japanese perspective, the Pearl Harbor incident was viewed as an irrevocable pre-emptive strike to eliminate the present threat that hindered the Japanese path to resume the world supremacy in the absence of natural resources reserves. Japan assessed that the supply access could be only retained by Dutch controlled oil-rich Indonesia but in a way the US sea lane of communication in Pacific.
Similarly, to secure the oil supply as a crucial source, America came to power play in Iran, 1953 behind the coup of the democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh and the installed the vicious-monarchy regime, Shah Reza Pahlevi. The only mistake of Mossadegh was to nationalize the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Company. Interestingly in Iran case for example, the most American inspiring Wilsonian ideal was no longer pursued when the interests were colliding. The oil has undeniably played an important role in truly shaping the realpolitik of state and regional stability in history. The question is how to rationalize the political nature of natural resources competition among major states in generating the conflict and instability in the world. The paper is trying to assess the irrevocably colliding interests to seek power and supremacy and its possible major conflicts among major states in the pursuit of oil supply as a crucial element to meet the objectives that is now overshadowed by the energy depletion. Does the likelihood of future conflict greater increase?
Hegemony and Colliding Interests
In traditional realism, a state’s interest will be shaped by the power. It is to gain access of natural resources and pursue the political influence. Martin Wrights highlighted it as “the nature to expand”, of which ‘an excess energy’ that radiates culturally, politically and economically. If there are no obstacles, the energy will be summed up in territorial growth. But the danger lies when every state naturally prefers to seek relative gain rather than absolute gain that was characterized by the combined use of military and economical might to pursue their national interests. The relative gain stems from the notion that a nation may not obtain the supremacy and wealth but only weaken the other’s state interests. At the end, all related problems end up in security dilemma.
Historically, the crucial impacts of new great powers always brings international political change as pointed out by Robert Gilpin,” A precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power towards those actors who would benefit most of the from a change in the system.” Highlighted by the causes of the WWI (World War 1), Robert North and Nazli Choucri introduced “lateral pressure theory” to elucidate the three composites of world conflicts; “the dynamics of national growth, international competition, and war.” Growth both population density and advanced technology in a nation generate larger demands for wide amounts of natural resources that often can not be fulfilled by its domestic resources availability. The domestic incapability or deficiency, in turn, generates “lateral pressure” described as a greater inclination among rising powers to expand their external activities on behalf on “raw material, markets, living space, religious converts, military or naval bases, or simply adventure.” Thus rapid growth and modernization irrevocably need “external expansion or extraterritorial national interests” to sustain. The likelihood of conflict will prevail when there are two or more interests collide as seen in history a classic case between Dutch and Royal British in Anglo-Dutch wars over trade and primacy at sea and Pacific War in 1941 between two rising powers, Japan and the newly superpower, the US over the Pacific sea lane communication. But the quest for political and economy influence will be heavily dependent on the extent, type and intensity of lateral pressure itself and the relatively high-capability countries (population and advanced technology) as well.
When oil exploration was found in 1930, the oil-reserve region –two third in Gulf- became strategic value and strategic interests. Historically, energy resources have been the source of the power as well as the world hegemony. Using the advantages of wind and water-based technology, Dutch seized the world power through its naval superiority (1590-1720), and then replaced by British with the more reliably coal-powered technology (1760-1914). But the coal era was over due to the lack of its efficiency (man power) and effectiveness (greater speed) after the discovery of oil. Since then, oil turn to be source of power. In a capitalism circumstance, oil has strategically incorporated with the nature of nation, seeking power and hegemony. Therefore, any rising powers tended to base on their supremacy upon oil. But the problems -for British itself- laid on the issues either defending the traditional fuel that was at large domestically provided or the conversion of the new energy that reliant on insecure and distant area. For those questions, Churchill and many world leaders of rising powers had their similar words,” There were no choices; mastery itself was the prize of the venture.” Or in other word, the mastery is a price of “national interest’.
In term of oil competition and the likelihood of the conflicts, Daniel Yiergen indicated three underlying components that most likely shaped. Two of them are the rise and the development of capitalism and oil as a commodity intimately intertwined with national strategies and global politics and power.
The rise of capitalism: was characterized by two likely trends, in first place, the emergence of private global corporations that played the role as importantly as traditional states. In European and America per se, the existence of borderless corporations has been politically incorporated and permeated within politics. The prominent political figures in Bush Administration consist of some ex-MNC corporate leaders that undeniably had any political and economical interests behind their involvements in politics. Donald Rumsfeld owned oil company, Shell. Condoleezza Rice used to be a director of Chevron for decades so Halliburton’s Dick Cheney. The allegations of frauds and abuses of power are often directed to the way they operate. Michael Perkins said that the US foreign policy was web-trapped in promoting the interests of the U.S. Corporatocracy (a coalition of government, banks, and corporations). The second place, oil has been identified as the world’s biggest and most pervasive industry that irrevocably embodied the 20th evolution of business, of corporate strategy, technological change and indeed the impact on both national and international economies. The oil industries are described as the business that starkly and extremely draws the definition of reward and risk and has profound impact of change and fate as well. Accordingly, 7 oil industries represented the world’s top twenty companies and the 21th is still deserved to be the century of oil. So it is not remarkably surprising –based on the two likely trends- that the underlying operations of MNCs are far-reaching and –in many cases- beyond their economical interests. Oil in Capitalism is undeniably a massive catalyst of wealth and power for individuals, companies and nations. The oil story in one side has created the cunning and powerful relationships between businessmen and politicians but in the other side, reflected political struggles, power play, regime changes and international conflicts.
The national interests and global power: The battlefields of WWI illustrated the petroleum as an important element of national power. Oil was the course and outcome of WWII. America regained the hegemony after World War II undeniably stemmed from its oil supremacy and dominance. For similar reasons, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor to protect their flank in seizing oil- rich Indonesia as well as Hitler’s strategic objective to invade Soviet was to capture of Caucus oil fields. But the US dominance of the oil reserves was proved to be decisive because the both Japan and Germany war machines finally ran out of oil supply. But reversely, -historically noted- oil also wasted and declined the owner’s strategic position. The Soviet squandered its oil income to push the remarkable military buildup and a series of useless and disastrous international adventure that eventually led to its demise. The US used to be the largest world producer but the largest consumer as well. Therefore, America has to import a half of its oil supply so inevitably weaken its strategic position and add the burdensome trade deficits. The battle for oil control after WWII then shifted between the international companies versus the developing countries as the next theater of animosity post colonization and emergence of nationalism. “Over the last few decades the trend has been for major resource holders to rely to a greater extent on national oil companies (NOCs) to manage their oil and gas production. In recent years, with high prices, some countries such as Russia and Venezuela have increased the authority of these state companies. NOCs control some three quarters of the world’s oil reserves.” It is expected to increase and takes shape into a classical pattern such as ethnic rivalry, regime changes, and economic competition, regional and international struggle. Oil commodity is still critical to national and international politics.
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