*Ahmad Dzakirin
The Malacca Straits are geopolitically strategic as the shortest waterway between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean . The straits are situated between the coastline of Thailand , Malaysia and Singapore to the East and the Indonesian island of Sumatra Indonesia
The Straits of Malacca are the oldest and busiest shipping lanes in the world. Being the shortest sea route of the two oceans, the straits are the most economically preferred sea route. The annual average sea transports through the Straits in 2004 are around 70.000 vessels or 200 per day, of which 20.000 are supertankers that roughly “represent 80 percent of Asia-pacific countries trade volume as well as 25 percent of total world trade commodity”.
The Straits have been economically and strategically important to sustain the economic growth for countries in East and South Asia. For example, two-thirds of the tonnage passing through the Straits consists of crude oil from the Persian Gulf bound for some emerging powers such as Japan, South Korea, India and, increasingly, China. The total amounts of oil transports through the Straits are three times greater than Suez Canal and fifteen greater than Panama Canal .
Nowadays, it grows a greater concern of the security management of the Straits. The fears stem from the increasing trend of piracy and armed robbery along 1999-2005. The Straits actually have been “the favorite hunting ground” from the acts of piracy for long time, but the following 9/11 terrorist attack, the issue of security in the Straits became more sensitive. The IMO report indicated that the maritime crimes were in alarming state. Based on the 2004 annual reports of the IMB (International Maritime Bureau), there were 330 reported cases of the acts of piracy around the world, of which 169 cases were reported in the Straits of Malacca and mostly 68 cases in Indonesian waters. As matter of fact, it was always estimated to be twice rather than formally reported. (See figure.1)
The growing fears are that the traditional maritime crimes will be hijacked by terrorists groups for political purposes that eventually will disrupt the one of the world’s pivotal sea lanes. However, some armed robbery incidents with relatively well equipped weapons like grenades and M-16 assault weapons were allegedly conducted by the former GAM (Achehnese Freedom Movement), although admittedly, there are no actual incidents that are convincingly associated with the terrorist groups.
Figure 1. The Acts of Piracy in the Straits of Malacca (Indonesian Waters)
2003-2006
Locations | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
Actual Attack | 41 | 39 | 15 | 10 |
Attempted Attack | 34 | 29 | 7 | 9 |
Total | 75 | 68 | 22 | 19 |
Source: IMB’s Annual Piracy Reports 2003-2006
The Different Perspective of Littoral States on Security of the Straits
The Indonesia
Based on its ideological perspectives, Indonesia indicated its disagreement of the US-proposed RMSI or the likes on the new security arrangement of the Straits of Malacca. Indonesia
In the MIMA Conference 2006, Indonesia argued that the concern of the security in the Straits that was heightened by the high incidents of piracy and armed robbery should be settled and referred to the UNCLOS. Indonesia
Given different definition, Indonesia sees the different legal ramification of the security management of the Straits. Regarding ‘armed robberies’, Indonesia
The problems come from the wider definition set by IMB (International Maritime Bureau) that represents the interests of insurance companies. The definition points out that piracy covers all crimes conducted either in territorial waters or high seas and ranges from heavily armed criminal acts to petty crimes usually committed in harbor environment. Such definition is unquestionably refuted by Indonesia
Indonesia contends that the security management in the straits is basically unilateral action. But on basis of ‘good neighbor policy’, it allows the trilateral actions among three littoral states, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore through TTEG (Tripartite Technical Experts Group on Safety of Navigation), or the multilateral cooperation in terms of technical assistance and intelligence gathering.
Therefore, Indonesia objects to the idea to the participation of user states in securing the Straits. Indonesia Indonesia
Besides, Indonesian’s security concern domestically focused on the sea law enforcement on the Straits and other territorial waters due to high illegal human and drug trafficking, illegal logging, fishing, sand mining and oil smuggling activities. Those activities potentially undermined Indonesian economy and environments; meanwhile maritime-based terrorism or piratical activities that became instruments of terrorism are deemed rare and not Indonesian utmost interests.
The Malaysia
Malaysia and Indonesia have quite similar positions in regards to responses of any new maritime security arrangement and the assertiveness of sovereignty on the Straits. In the 1971, Malaysia Indonesia and Malaysia and Zone B, territorial sea boundaries between Malaysia and Indonesia
But Post Cold War and subsequently 9/11 event; there was a challenge of state sovereignty doctrine that was any longer deemed sacrosanct. It asserted external powers rights to intervene in the state that were unable or unwilling to suppress violent group, particularly those pose danger beyond those nations’ borders as well as the rights of pre-emptive and preventive self defense, combined with the interventionist concept of sovereignty, could under certain circumstances lead to unilateral action suppress piracy, terrorism and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) transport in the Straits of Malacca.
In the development, the US and India have deployed the naval vessels transiting the Straits under transit passage regime. The India US States , Malaysia and Indonesia Malaysia
On the other hand, the deployment of certain major maritime power will provoke tension among other conflicting major maritime powers and hence jeopardize the coastal states’ interests in creating regional stability. The reason has its ground when “China accuses that the deployment of the US naval forces in the Straits of Malacca will destroy the neutral status of the region and creates a strategic imbalance’. For China, The US naval presence can be double-coined strategy, one side on “war on terrorism” purpose but the other side, to contain China. Given the tension between China and India as well as China and the US over the Taiwan
However, out of the likelihood of sea terrorism are not immediate Malaysia’s concerns due to less apparent piracy incidents in its territorial waters, the Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi contended that the US military presence and exercises just bolstered the ideological appeal of extremist elements. Otherwise, the root of terrorism has yet to be addressed and even acknowledged by international community. The excessive measures just encouraged culture of terrorism instead. On the contrary, Malaysia
The Singapore
Singapore posits itself as an economic and financial hub, of which the heart of its economic sector heavily counts on the freedom of shipping transport in the Straits of Malacca. “The Singapore’s economic livelihood and political independence is dependent on continued use of the Straits by the major maritime powers.” The problem is Singapore is a coastal state as well as a major user state. Any positive or negative measures that are taken in terms of the uses of the Straits will indeed affect its economic sustainability and furthermore state’s livelihood. For example, the abrupt closure of the Straits due to pollution incidents will severe its economic repercussion.
Hence, Singapore’s strategic perspective regarding the management of the Straits much more reflects the intent of the maximum freedom of navigation in one hand and the assurance of secure SLC (Sea Lane Communication) and SLT (Sea Lane Trade) in other hand. Since, the formation TTEG (Tripartite Technical Experts Group on Safety of Navigation), the Singapore Singapore in one party and Indonesia and Malaysia
In the wake of terrorist threat, Singapore concerned very much about the safety of navigation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and assessed the vulnerabilities of maritime sector to terrorist attacks. The concern was heightened by the increase number of piracy and armed robberies incidents along 1999-2004 in the Straits that was portrayed as “the most piracy-prone in the world” and the possible nexus between piracy and terrorist groups. Moreover, the Achehnese rebel group was alleged to be behind some armed robbery activities in the northern tip of the Straits before the Indonesian-GAM peaceful settlement. The maritime terrorism threat that is considered the “low probability but high impact scenario” will definitely affect the economic consequences due to disruption of shipping traffic. Hence, the fundamental issue is the safety of transportation in the Straits of Malacca and its all dimensions should embrace issues of security and environmental protection as well, as an integral part of maritime security building.
Due to the lack of the capacity and expertise of the littoral States, Singapore favors the involvement of some major states in regards with the maintenance of security and safety on the Straits. In International Conference on Asia in 2004, Singapore Singapore
The new maritime security arrangement is required in the wake of new terrorism threat. Although the direct link between high piracy incidents and the likelihood of maritime terrorism threat in the Straits is not apparent, but the new challenges of the maritime security and its complexity of the day require creative and innovative responses. The development of idea, “one size fits all” panacea seems no longer relevant, therefore new interlink network of cooperative arrangement among stakeholders is irrevocably required. Singapore seems much more flexible to interpret the UNCLOS provision and the ‘sovereignty doctrine‘. Singapore moved forward to become a party or proponent of many new security arrangements such as SUA Protocol, PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) and the newly RMSI proposal that much more reflects the Singapore Singapore
Is The Threat Real? The Same Concern but Different Interests
The figures of the piratical and the armed crimes in the Straits already speak up for themselves. They significantly reveal the fears that the navigational security in the Straits is alarming state. The incidents have put the straits to be the most dangerous waters after Somalia Sea
Many new maritime security arrangements that required the extra-security initiatives are introduced. Singapore States , Indonesia and Malaysia Indonesia and Malaysia could request Singapore to withdraw the licenses and stipulated the licenses only in Singapore
Similarly, the US proposed the RMSI as a building block that to be deemed an effective, multilateral approach to new maritime security. The initiative included the extra regional naval forces to patrol along the Straits and helped to curb piracy, terrorism, and WMD proliferation, gun and drug smuggling and human trafficking. Although the US clarified that the initiative was not a unilateral US initiative and a challenge of sovereignty but again, some littoral states, especially Malaysia and Indonesia denied the proposal and perceived a part of scenario to “internationalize” the management of Straits and the US
In the opening of the MIMA Conference in Kuala Lumpur, 2004, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Najib Razak indicated some parties among user States to “free ride” on the situation of the Straits and extended the requirement of the burden sharing as stipulated in Article 43 of UNCLOS in terms of navigational security, not merely in accordance with safety.
For the long time, the littoral States called for the realization of the Article 43 among the user States in the Straits but over 22 years since the treaty was ratified, only Japan and soon possibly China- showed its concern and helped the coastal States to improve and maintain their navigational safety. The user States just utilized these services for their own benefits but did not balance the user States’ obligations to provide assistances. Therefore, the extension of the requirement of Article 43 became more sensitive, politicized and contentious.
For Indonesian itself, the suspicion on the US intention in the Straits became heightened. Indonesian public questioned why the US was not suffice to lift the weaponry embargo on Indonesia to upgrade its military capability and let the Indonesian military handle the security situation in the Straits along with two adjacent coastal States, Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesian worried to become second front of the US ’s interests in the Southeast Asia that would compromise its national interests. The apprehension was shown by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense at press conference with Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense in his visit in Jakarta
Otherwise, Littoral States (Indonesia and Malaysia) prefer to solve the problems in terms of navigational security trilaterally. As modality, coastal states already had the mechanism to settle the issues through the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting and its body, TTEG since 1971. At the very beginning, the Malacca-Singapore Straits Committee at very senior level discussed policy matters regarding these Straits such as context of UNCLOS, the discussion with Japan
The long enduring impact of financial crisis in 1998 actually weakened the capability of coastal states like Indonesia to solve the security problems in the Straits, ranging from the lack of adequate navigational security and safety equipments to disparity between the existing poor, miserable living of coastal community in Riau islands and along the Straits and closely distant wealth Singapore. After the crisis, the latter –disparity- has been entry for crime drives.
Piracy itself was not a new phenomenon in the Straits. Piracy that was mostly in line with the petty crimes has been traditionally ‘way of life’ and legal seasonal job for Orang Laut (Sea People) that lives long in the Straits to earn living. They were pillaging the areas in the vicinity of Singapore
From the perspectives, the security issues are much reflecting both the domestic and trilateral coastal states domain rather than international one. In addition, the Straits belong to transit regime, i.e. straits are used for international navigation (Article 43 of UNCLOS). But the problems come from the slow responses of coastal States and the lack of united stance among coastal States in responding the issues due to different interests.
The description brings the lights that settlement of the security issues in the Straits is to likely enhance cooperation among coastal states, in sense of conducting more coordinated security arrangements in the Straits in one hand and on the other hand, the improvement of coastal states’ security capacity building with assistances from the user States. The mutual efforts will enhance trust and cooperation between coastal and user states. The current security per se should be the common interest of the coastal states –by reconciling the differences in the threat of ‘snowball’ of internationalization for Indonesia and Malaysia and the disruption of Singapore
The Way Forward: Confidence Building
In retrospect, the three coastal States already enhanced the cooperation and confidence building measures. The differing perceptions of security should not impede cooperation between littoral States and the user States
The Littoral States suggested more comprehensive settlement and structured the cooperation among the littoral States and the user States based on the existing institutional frameworks such as:
- Tripartite Ministerial Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and its subsidiary body, the Tripartite Technical Expert Group on Navigational Safety
- The 1971 Joint Statement on the Straits of Malacca and
- Article 43 of the UNCLOS
But the question is whether such existing framework in 1971 could sufficiently address the complex situation in the Straits nowadays. The answer is to lie on the way forward to interpret more broadly ‘maritime building measures’ that more conveniently confront the challenge and dynamism of the maritime development within the respect of coastal states’ territorial sovereignty. It is highly important to reduce the suspicions that every new maritime arrangement will not be politicized. Therefore, a long existing contentious issue that needs to be addressed is the social responsibility of the stakeholder to meet the requirement of burden sharing as stipulated by UNCLOS.
In turn, the coastal States must take a very leading role to ensure the security in the Straits. The coastal States must implement the assertion policy to reduce the number of piracy and armed robbery incidents. It is expected to affect the question of littoral States’ capability in securing the Straits as well as –in fact- impede at very beginning, the eminent likelihood of the nexus between piracy and terrorist groups.
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