(i) Geography shapes strategy
(ii) Culture shapes geographical understanding which shapes strategic choices
(iii) Strategies shape technology
(iv) Technology shapes strategies
(v) Culture shapes strategies which ignores logic of technological advancement
(vi) Geography informs technology to be used.
The essay concludes that there is interplay between the 3 variables, with ethnocentrism as always shaping the geographical and technological dimensions to strategies despite their seemingly objective attributes.
Ethnocentrism or Culture
Strategy is formulated by the total calculation of what we can do and what we cannot do to achieve our goals. The rationalist states that this calculation is shaped by a single logic, derived through trial and error and historical leanings. The opponent on the other hand, claims that the formulation of a strategy is governed by one’s ethnocentric or cultural worldview. Ethnocentrism is here understood as the synonym for being “culture-bound”, where an individual or a group is unable to see the world through the eyes of a different national or ethic group. In this understanding, there is no one theory of rationality, but competing theories of rationality which will result in different strategic choices.
For example, during the Cold War, the United States (US) regarded the Soviet doctrine as irrational. To the US , the doctrine of “flexible response” and “controlled escalations” serve as a logical strategy to prevent mutual destruction while checking the opponent through limited attacks. On the other hand, Soviet Union ’s doctrine was guided by “crushing rebuff” of US to prevent the latter from doing even minor damage to the Soviet. This seemed to be an irrational behaviour, considering that the Soviet Union had large spaces to allow for US limited attacks on its soil without serious consequences. Despite the seeming irrational behaviour, Soviet strategy was actually guided by a logic that was shaped by historical memory of severe destruction during the Second World War. The Soviet Union hence rejected any form of limited attacks on its homelands, and consequently, rejected the doctrine of “controlled escalations”.
Clearly, one’s cultural heredity can prevent one from seeing certain options which might nevertheless be “rational”. The Soviet Union had subsequently proposed the idea of mutual “no first use” of nuclear weapons. This was rejected by the US who doubted Soviet’s sincerity. Guided by an ethnocentric attitude which failed to understand the reasons for Soviet’s proposal, the US then pursued a strategy of over insurance against Soviet Union ’s superior quantity of nuclear weapons.
Geography
(i) Geography shapes strategy
According to Colin Gray, there are two meanings of geography. Firstly geography can refer to the physical geography which exists objectively. It also refers to space (including cyberspace), distance, time and weather. Strategy has to take into account physical geography, since every action that strategy has dictated to be done or will affect strategy is done through a space. At the tactical level of war, strategy has to respond to environmental factors.
(ii) Culture shapes geographical understanding which shapes strategic choices.
Even as it appears that physical geography is an objective attribute, it is in reality subjective to different cultural understandings, hence shaping an individual’s strategic choices. For example, a soldier in a heavily forested and mountainous terrain will view his strategic options differently from a pilot who has a bird’s eye view of the area.
That geography is not a value-free concept which one considers when devising a strategy is pointed out by Colin Gray in the second meaning of geography. This pertains to our imagined spatial and temporal relations we have with others that is shaped by various factors including culture, history and economics. For example, we imagine the world to be divided into various regions such as Europe, Asia, and Middle East . During the Cold war, geographic spaces were also understood primarily as either communist or not. The example of Turkey , which borders the Middle East and Europe , but wishes to identify itself with the latter further serves to show how our geographical perceptions are shaped by non-geographical factors.
This mental image also guides grand theories of geopolitics, a discipline which examines the political and strategic significance of geography. Geopolitical strategy refers to the use of geographical concepts to serve the state. An example of a geopolitical strategy is Mandala’s theory that one’s immediate enemy is one’s enemy, and their neighbours beyond are one’s allies. However, the theory cannot be employed as a strategy without taking into account cultural and historical context. For example, Israel will not consider Saudi Arabia or Iraq as its natural allies. Israel ’s strategy is shaped by a geo-political understanding that it is surrounded by hostile Arab neighbours who threaten its very existence.
Military technology and Culture
(i) Strategies shape technology
An interactive relationship exists between strategy and weaponry with strategy always taking the front seat. Colin Gray posits that strategy gives meaning to weapons and hence without clear strategies, the weapons acquisitions process degenerates into political arm-wrestling.
Traditionally, the strategic community nudges scientists to develop better military technology so as to give the former more strategic choices. This race to develop better technology is seen both in WW I and WW II. The former marked the entry of fully industrialized warfare, where many new technologies were developed quickly to meet wartime needs, particularly military aircraft and vehicles. The latter marked the most frantic period of weapons development in the history of humanity with new designs and concepts fielded, and all existing technologies were improved between 1939 and 1945. With the onset of the Cold War, the constant technological development of new weapons was institutionalized, as participants engaged in a constant race to develop weapons and counter-weapons. This arms race continues into the modern era.
Today, constant research is done in hope that new technologies will shorten combat, minimize casualties, and enable attacks to be carried out with greater precision.
(ii) Military technology shapes strategy
Whilst strategy shapes the advancemen to of miltiary technology, it seems that military technology also shapes strategy. According to Bernard Brodie, nuclear weaponary as “the absolute weapon” will cause such massive destruction when used that a strategy of preventing war rather than using the weapons to fight a war is devised.
(iii) Culture shapes strategy negating military technology
However, one again sees how culture may drive strategies. Despite the advance in military technology in WWI, where stronger artillery power was supposed to privileged defence over offence, the cult of the offensive still informed the military doctrines of the major European powers which yearned for quick decisive warfare.
Geography and Military Technology
(i) Geography shapes military technological requirements
Geographical consideration can also shape military technological development. For example, Britain as an isle prompted it to develop military technology related to retaining its supremacy at sea, which was also vital for securing trade routes. Development of military tech for British Navy was evident in early 18th century. There was increasing built-up of her fleet in quantity and quality: from wooden hull – Trafalgar 1805, to iron clad – Dreadnought class 1906. Along with this, British Navy also developed tactics and establish naval training institutions in 1733. Hence, geography shapes the technological choices that dominate tactics, logistics, institutions and military culture.
(ii) Technological advancement shapes the way we view geography
Our perceptions of geophysical matters also vary according to technological advances. For example, without the railway, strategic plans such as the German Schlieffen plan, which required rapid mass mobilisation of forces across large areas, would not be conceived. In this case, the railway was a civilian technology turned military technology. This idea was recognised by Prussian Gen Moltke around the late 1800s.
Conclusion:
The relationship between culture, geography, military technology and strategy is complex, where there is any interplay between these variables. However, it seems that in the last vein, culture always informs other dimensions of strategy.
Group 1:
Ahmad Dzakirin Jolene Anne R Jerard
Koh Ke Yuan Zhou Suli
Lim Cheng Chuan Johnny Soh Fong Jin
John Campbell Michael
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