*Ahmad Dzakirin
IntroductionHow do we see the inclination of Southeast Asia States’ steadily increasing military spending (see table 1) in subsequent years? Does it lead to an arm race that risks regional security and the multilateral cooperation that fruitfully shapes the Southeast’s interstate relation so far. Aaron Friedberg inferred that future Asia, including Southeast Asia will be inclined to rivalry due to diverse governmental and societal forms, the continuing power of nationalism and being under-institutionalized. Even most prominent ASEAN -he argued- has been more than a loose collection of the region’s less powerful states.
On the other hand, some IR analysts are more concerned that the future inter-states relation will be institutionally transformed into shared common identity and norms –we feeling- and dominantly shaped by multilateralism channel. Therefore, the military buildup and modernization in Constructivist’s approach were deemed to be balance against threat -not against power. Mostly Southeast Asian problems concerns with their internal
Table 1. Military Balance of Southeast Asia States 2005-2006
Con | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | ||||||||
GDP* | Grth* | Inf* | D.B* | GDP | Grth* | Inf* | D.b | GDP | Grt* | D.B | |
Ind | 243 | 4.9 | 6.8 | 2.12 | 251 | 5.1 | 6.1 | 2.34 | - | - | 2.53 |
May | 103 | 5.3 | 1.1 | 2.41 | 117 | 7.1 | 1.4 | 2.25 | 2.47 | ||
Thai | 143 | 6.9 | 1.8 | 1.93 | 161 | 6.1 | 2.7 | 1.93 | - | - | 1.95 |
Sing | 91.4 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 8.24 | 105 | 8.4 | 1.6 | 8.62 | - | - | 9.25 |
Phil | 79.3 | 4.7 | 3.0 | 840 m | 86.5 | 6.1 | 5.5 | 824m | - | - | 844m |
Viet | 39.5 | 7.3 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 45.4 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 3.17 | - | - | 3.47 |
*GDP in billion dollar, *Growth (%), *Inflation (%), *Defense Budget (Billion dollar) except Philippine in million.
The Theoretical Foundation
Assessing the existence of arms races, we have to define first the terminology and its implementation regarding military necessity for state affairs. Generally, an arms race is a competition between two or more countries for military supremacy. Each party competes to produce larger number of weapons, greater armies, or superior military technology in a technological escalation. More qualitatively, an arms race is defined as a condition wherein two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in adversary relationship increase or improve their armament at a rapid rate and structure their respective military postures with general attention to the past, current and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties. Based on these, some parameters can be drawn in defining that arms race exists in military buildup: the state’s policy, rapid rate of military spending and structure and increasing adversary relationship or the degree of threat perception among states.
Regarding state’s doctrine, the existence of the country is highly determined by its national policy more than characteristics of weaponry system and an increasing military budget. Collins Gray contended that the existing arms races will be at best described by how we distinguished the state types, satisfied and dissatisfied, or between reformists, perhaps even revolutionary states and status quo states. From the differences of the types, a policy of the state is judged whether is offensively or defensively characterized. Meanwhile, threat perception according to Walt will be spurred by military power, offensive capability, geographic proximity and aggressive intentions.
Does Arm Race Exist?
Referring to such categories, I’m inclined to say that there is no arms race in Southeast Asian States. Before examining the military spending and posture within Southeast Asian states, we must differentiate between an arms race and modernization. It’s true that there is a steadily increasing military spending but not at rapid rate to be considered as an arms race. In subsequent three years, the increase in military spending is average below 10 percent. (See table 2) Singapore military spending is largest -4 times of second largest Indonesian military spending in 2005- among other ASEAN members that would be elaborated in the scope of threat perception but this posture did not statistically provoke the other excessive military spending response within Southeast Asian States, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia. And even, Philippine maintained the lowest military budget although facing the actual threats from China occupation over Mischief Reef islands and its dormant disputes against Malaysia over Sabah.
Table 2. The ratio of military spending in three subsequent years.
Countries | 2003-2004 (%) | 2004-2005(%) | ||
DB* | GDP | DB* | GDP | |
Indonesia | 10,4% | 3.2% | 8.1% | - |
Malaysia | -6 % | 13% | 9.8% | - |
Thailand | 0% | 12.5% | 1% | - |
Singapore | 4.1% | 14% | 7.3% | - |
Philippine | -1% | 9% | 2.4% | - |
Vietnam | 9.3% | 14% | 9.4% | |
*Defense Budget *Gross Domestic Product
Table 2 explicates that there is no immediate threat that engenders the policy makers among Southeast Asian states to raise at rapid rate their domestic military arms buildup. Interestingly, although there was a steady increase of GDP among ASEAN states in 2003, it did not automatically implicate the increase of their military budget. Even for instance: Malaysia and Philippine reversely lowered their military spending. Therefore, it can be inferred that -at least for short and middle run- Southeast Asian countries do not perceive their neighbor states the imminent threat
The steady increase in military budget can be at best described as military modernization that fully directed to pursue increasing military capabilities in handling domestic security issues. Southeast Asian countries encounter the persistent security problems that plague the region, such as terrorism, porous borders, myriad contraband, piracy, maritime disputes, separatism and counterinsurgency. Leonard Sebastian also indicated that there are no arms races in Southeast Asia. Admittedly, there were some aspects of arms racing in term of new weapons acquisitions prior to the crises but these were purely for purposes of prestige-so called modernization- upgrading old weapon system with new and keeping up with the changes of technology. The modernization can lead to arms race when there is a clear escalation- one country buys a top range weapon and the neighboring country follows.
If we look at table 3, we will notice that Southeast Asian states’ military spending for their military equipments are more likely to support the military effectiveness in settling their aforementioned issues. Most Southeast Asian armed forces are not purchasing state-of-the art weapons system for enhancing an offensive capabilities or aggression intentions but rather for defensive purposes, e.g. developing air and naval capabilities to monitor nearby air and sea territory. Meanwhile, Singapore’s military equipment purchases were doubled during the Asian economic crises to pursue the sophisticated military buildup both for deterrence or a defense strategy while its neighbor countries like Indonesia and Malaysia froze their military equipment purchases. Singapore’s leadership in some degrees still perceived threat perception that conflicts may occur in the volatile region.
Table 3. Arms Orders and Deliveries of Southeast Asia countries 2003-2004
Countries | Classification | Designation | Quantity | Order Date | Comment |
Indonesia | - Hel - PCO - SSK -FGA | MI-28 skytruck MI-8 (hip) MI-35 (Hind) Sigma SSK SU-27/SU 30 | 11 8 7 2 4 6 | 2004 2004 2003/2004 2003 2004 2004 | Not yet delivered Not yet delivered 2 delivered Not yet delivered Not yet delivered 4 delivered |
Malaysia | -Hel -Trg -MBT FGA | A-109 Mi-8 (hip) MB-339 PT-91M SU-30 MKK | 11 10 17 48 18 | 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 | Not yet delivered Delivered second hand delivered 2005 delivered 2008 |
Thailand | -PRC | WMZ 551 | 97 | - | Barter deal MOU |
Singapore | - | - | - | - | - |
Philippine | - | - | - | - | - |
Vietnam | -Hel -FGA | M-28 Su-22K | 10 40 | 2005 2005 | Delivered Deliv |
Source: Data used above is compiled from: The military Balance 2006, IISS, p 310-314
Southeast Asian states are more likely to feel threatened with China, especially after subsequent territorial conflicts follow, The China’s war with Vietnam 1979, Beijing strategy of ‘creeping assertiveness’ was deemed to gradually consolidate its presence on the Paracel and Spratly islands at a pace that provoked complaints from Philippines and Vietnam. As middle powers, Acharya noted that Southeast Asia countries preferred approach to regional orders seems to lay maintenance of regional balance of power, underpinned by the superior and forward-deployed military resources of the US and capable of deterring Chinese and Japanese regional ambitions. But Southeast Asian countries through extending their memberships and ARF smartly engaged those major powers in multilateral mechanism effectively leading to a new Beijing flexibility in its disputes with some ASEAN countries. China accepted the UN Law of the Sea as a basis of negotiation, reached the understanding with Malaysia and Philippines, increased the joint development, and agreed to discuss the disputes with ASEAN multilaterally. ASEAN played the mixed strategy of power balance to encounter China without risking helplessly costly military buildup and races and benefited economic and military incentives instead. But, in the long run, future China will be determined with their politics whether typically limited-aims revisionist or revolutionary dissatisfied power. Thanks to Taiwan unsettlement, ASEAN does not perceive China an imminent.
Military Modernization: A Conclusion
What are then the reasons behind military modernization in Southeast Asia? There are generally at least three important reasons of military modernization and the absence of arms races in Southeast Asia countries in certain degrees. In the first place, some Southeast Asian countries found the need to improve their military capabilities in handling recent domestic problem after postponement of purchasing military equipments during economic crisis. For example, Indonesia’s defense equipments are 20 years behind and 60 percentages ill-operated. With geographically archipelago, Indonesia encountered some sustained problems with illegal fishing, weapon and human contraband, ethnic outbreaks and territorial disputes. If we look at Philippine, we can conclude that its defense equipment is even worse-off. It only has F5 Tiger and Bronco, ex-Vietnam War jetfighters and is militarily ill-equipped. Thailand as shown table.2 did not keep the remarkable increase and even there was no increase military budget 2003-2004 and 1 percent increase in between 2004-2005. Thailand perceives relatively safe with its strategic alliance with US and in engaging with China, therefore draws no immediate need to increase their military capacity. (See table.3) its domestic turbulence of indigenous Malay ethnics in South Thailand does not necessarily yield the fear of Malaysia intervention.
Secondly, ASEAN countries are growing to be preoccupied with their steadily increasing economic growth after economic crisis in 1987. There is a series study that leads to the close relationship between economic growth and increasing military spending in Southeast Asian from early 1960 until the late 1980. The highest rate of GNP implicates the highest military expenditures. In this respect, Singapore’s largest military spending can be acknowledged. As matter of fact, Singapore has been military superior in Southeast Asia until 2015.
Thirdly, benefiting US military presence to balance China and furthermore accepting India and Japanese naval presence to secure the sea line of communication will be likely to pacify the possible tension of interstate territorial disputes either within or outside Southeast Asian countries.
Table 4. Comparison of Military Forces in Southeast Asia Countries
Countries | Military Personnel | Army | Navy | Air Force |
Indonesia | 230,000 active, 400,000 reserves | 455 tanks, 731 APCs | 7 frigates, 16 corvettes, 8 craft, 2 submarines, 26 LST, 12 Minehunters | 2 SU fighter bombers, 2 Su-27 jetfighters , 14 A4 Skyhawk fighter Bombers, 10 F16A/B jetfighters, 12 F5 Tiger II fighter-bombers, 42 Hawk jet trainers/ground attack aircraft, 12 OV 10F reconnaissance aircraft, 3 Boeing 737-200 MR, 26 super puma helicopters, 63 transport aircraft |
Malaysia | 80,000 active, 70,000 reserves | 26 tanks, 1,210 APC | 4 Frigates, 4 corvettes, 8 missile boats, 4 minehunters | 17 MiG29 jetfighters, 8 F18D Hornet Jetfighters, 13F5E Jetfighters, 25 Hawk jet trainers/ground attack, 2 RF-5E reconnaissance jet fighters, 9 MB-339, 52 pilatus PC-7 trainers/ground attack, RPV eagle 150 |
Thailand | 190,000 active, 200,000 reserves | 793 tanks, 1,035 APCs | 1 Aircraft carrier (9 Harriar V/STOL fighters Bombers, 6 S-70B Seahawk helicopters), 8 Frigates, 2 Corvettes, 6 Missile Boats, 7 minehunters, 7 LSTs | 13 FA/B Jetfighters, 50 F16A/B Jetfighters, 36 F5 Tiger II Fighter Bombers, 34 L-39ZA training/ground attack, 3 IAI-201 ELINT, 18 OV-10C, 3 RF-5A reconnaissance aircraft, 20 Alpha jet trainers, 58 MR/ASW aircraft |
Singapore | 50,000 active, 300,000 reserves | 450 tanks, 1,574 APC | 46 corvettes, 6 missile boats, 4 submarines, 4 minehunters | 40 Skyhawks, 37 F5 Tiger, 8 reconnaissance fighters , 42 F16C/D Fighters, 7F16A/B Fighters, 55 Helicopter transports, 40 helicopter gunships, 6 Chinook, 4 Hawkeye E2C AEW, 1 MR Squadron, 1 RPV Squadron |
Philippine | 66,000 active, 175,000 reserves | 65 Tanks, 520 APCs | 1 Frigate and 13 offshore patrol Boats, 7 LSTs | 14 F5A/F5B, 52 Bell Helicopters, 12 AUH-76 helicopter gunships, 20 MD 520MG light helicopters, 1 F27 MR aircraft, 20 OV-10 Bronco, 2 RPV |
Vietnam | 412.000 active, 3-4 million reserves | 1,935 Tanks, 1,780 APCs | 13 Naval vessel, 5 corvettes, 10 torpedo craft, 10 minehunters, 6 LSTs, 2 Submarines | 53 Su-22 Fighter bombers, 36 Su-27 fighter-Bombers, 124 MiG-21 jetfighters, 26 Mi-24 helicopter gunships, 4 Be-12 MR Aircraft, 15 Ka-25/28/32 ASW helicopters |
Source: Data used above is compiled from: Andrew Tan, Force Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, January 2004 and military balance, IISS.
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